Eliciting information from a large population

This paper studies information transmission in social surveys where a welfare maximizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of individuals from a large population who have heterogeneous preferences. The population distribution of preferences is unknown and has to be estimated, based on...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of public economics 2013-07, Vol.103, p.44-54
1. Verfasser:	Kawamura, Kohei
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Cheap talk Communication Decision making Economic incentives Information exchange Non-binding referendums Preference distribution Public economics Random sampling Response bias Social surveys
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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