HUMAN COOPERATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT REPUTATION
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that puni...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Evolution 2013-08, Vol.67 (8), p.2446-2450 |
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| container_title | Evolution |
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| creator | dos Santos, Miguel Rankin, Daniel J. Wedekind, Claus |
| description | The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/evo.12108 |
| format | Article |
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However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0014-3820</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1558-5646</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/evo.12108</identifier><identifier>PMID: 23888865</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</publisher><subject>Biological altruism ; Biological Evolution ; BRIEF COMMUNICATION ; Cooperation ; Cooperative Behavior ; Discriminants ; Evolution ; Experimental game theory ; Game theory ; Games, Experimental ; Humans ; indirect reciprocity ; Models, Psychological ; Public goods ; Punishment ; Ratio test ; Reputations ; Social evolution ; Social groups ; Social interaction</subject><ispartof>Evolution, 2013-08, Vol.67 (8), p.2446-2450</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2013 Society for the Study of Evolution</rights><rights>2013 The Author(s). © 2013 The Society for the Study of Evolution.</rights><rights>2013 The Author(s). 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We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.</description><subject>Biological altruism</subject><subject>Biological Evolution</subject><subject>BRIEF COMMUNICATION</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Cooperative Behavior</subject><subject>Discriminants</subject><subject>Evolution</subject><subject>Experimental game theory</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Games, Experimental</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>indirect reciprocity</subject><subject>Models, Psychological</subject><subject>Public goods</subject><subject>Punishment</subject><subject>Ratio test</subject><subject>Reputations</subject><subject>Social evolution</subject><subject>Social groups</subject><subject>Social interaction</subject><issn>0014-3820</issn><issn>1558-5646</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNpdkE9Pg0AQxTdGY2v14AfQkHjxQjvD7sJyxIq2SQtNC17JQpekhBaFoum3d_tHTZzLTDK_9zLzCLlF6KOugfqs-mghiDPSRc6FyW1mn5MuADKTCgs65KppCgBwObqXpGNRocvmXQKjeOoFxjAMZ_7ci8ZhYDx5C__Z0MMsDsaL0dQPImPuz-LosL4mF7ksG3Vz6j0Sv_jRcGROwtfx0JuYBQUUJmZgce4IZadpBooCU8pyMiZzaVOeKpktmYsoc5UzlVGaK77MpRBAM8gVZrRHHo--73X10apmm6xXTabKUm5U1TYJMuQ26CccjT78Q4uqrTf6uj3lAmUCXU3dn6g2Xatl8l6v1rLeJT9ZaGBwBL5Wpdr97hGSfciJDjk5hJz4b-Fh0Iq7o6JotlX958iAWg4g_QbKvnJI</recordid><startdate>20130801</startdate><enddate>20130801</enddate><creator>dos Santos, Miguel</creator><creator>Rankin, Daniel J.</creator><creator>Wedekind, Claus</creator><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>7QG</scope><scope>7QL</scope><scope>7QP</scope><scope>7QR</scope><scope>7SN</scope><scope>7SS</scope><scope>7TK</scope><scope>7TM</scope><scope>7U9</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>H94</scope><scope>M7N</scope><scope>P64</scope><scope>RC3</scope><scope>7X8</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130801</creationdate><title>HUMAN COOPERATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT REPUTATION</title><author>dos Santos, Miguel ; 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| source | MEDLINE; Wiley Online Library; JSTOR; EZB Electronic Journals Library; Oxford Journals |
| subjects | Biological altruism Biological Evolution BRIEF COMMUNICATION Cooperation Cooperative Behavior Discriminants Evolution Experimental game theory Game theory Games, Experimental Humans indirect reciprocity Models, Psychological Public goods Punishment Ratio test Reputations Social evolution Social groups Social interaction |
| title | HUMAN COOPERATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT REPUTATION |
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