Auctions and alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights
Systems of transferable pollution rights are presently of interest to both researchers and policymakers due to their potential efficiency in controlling pollution. A range of alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights is examined. Using simulations based on realistic data from 2 water-po...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Land Econ.; (United States) 1982-02, Vol.58 (1), p.16-32 |
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| creator | Lyon, R.M |
| description | Systems of transferable pollution rights are presently of interest to both researchers and policymakers due to their potential efficiency in controlling pollution. A range of alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights is examined. Using simulations based on realistic data from 2 water-pollution-control case studies, an investigation is conducted of rights programs based upon: 1. sales of rights by the government under 2 distinct types of auctions, and 2. free initial distribution of rights by the government to dischargers on some basis, followed by exchange among dischargers of rights and funds. It is suggested, based on both theoretical and practical considerations, that a basic trade-off exists between decreasing the financial burden of rights purchases and removing the incentives for strategic behavior. Very few dischargers in either case study would have lower expenses under government sales of rights than under uniform treatment, no matter whether sales are by single-price or by incentive-compatible auctions. In spite of some problems regarding incentive compatibility, the rights allocation approach of free distribution followed by exchange appears to offer the most desirable package of features. The incentive-compatible procedure may be optimal regarding such objectives as individual incentive compatibility and efficiency. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/3146074 |
| format | Article |
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A range of alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights is examined. Using simulations based on realistic data from 2 water-pollution-control case studies, an investigation is conducted of rights programs based upon: 1. sales of rights by the government under 2 distinct types of auctions, and 2. free initial distribution of rights by the government to dischargers on some basis, followed by exchange among dischargers of rights and funds. It is suggested, based on both theoretical and practical considerations, that a basic trade-off exists between decreasing the financial burden of rights purchases and removing the incentives for strategic behavior. Very few dischargers in either case study would have lower expenses under government sales of rights than under uniform treatment, no matter whether sales are by single-price or by incentive-compatible auctions. In spite of some problems regarding incentive compatibility, the rights allocation approach of free distribution followed by exchange appears to offer the most desirable package of features. The incentive-compatible procedure may be optimal regarding such objectives as individual incentive compatibility and efficiency.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0023-7639</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1543-8325</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2307/3146074</identifier><identifier>CODEN: LAECAD</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: University of Wisconsin Press</publisher><subject>290300 - Energy Planning & Policy- Environment, Health, & Safety ; ALLOCATIONS ; Auctions ; Bidding ; Biochemical oxygen demand ; Case studies ; Cost allocation ; Cost efficiency ; Cost incentives ; ECONOMICS ; ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY ; environmental degradation ; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ; Environmental pollution ; Environmental regulation ; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ; GOVERNMENT POLICIES ; LEGAL INCENTIVES ; Payments ; Phosphorus ; Pollution ; POLLUTION ABATEMENT ; POLLUTION SOURCES ; Procedures ; Public policy ; Rights ; Simulation ; Tradeoff analysis ; waste management</subject><ispartof>Land Econ.; (United States), 1982-02, Vol.58 (1), p.16-32</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1982 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System</rights><rights>Copyright University of Wisconsin Press Feb 1982</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c420t-ffe305efc5cd117c6a9c16b7d08600d12cf477d4375b134edad89d041d1b0f763</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3146074$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3146074$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,881,27846,27901,27902,57992,58225</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.osti.gov/biblio/5447653$$D View this record in Osti.gov$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Lyon, R.M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Univ. of Texas, Austin</creatorcontrib><title>Auctions and alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights</title><title>Land Econ.; (United States)</title><description>Systems of transferable pollution rights are presently of interest to both researchers and policymakers due to their potential efficiency in controlling pollution. A range of alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights is examined. Using simulations based on realistic data from 2 water-pollution-control case studies, an investigation is conducted of rights programs based upon: 1. sales of rights by the government under 2 distinct types of auctions, and 2. free initial distribution of rights by the government to dischargers on some basis, followed by exchange among dischargers of rights and funds. It is suggested, based on both theoretical and practical considerations, that a basic trade-off exists between decreasing the financial burden of rights purchases and removing the incentives for strategic behavior. Very few dischargers in either case study would have lower expenses under government sales of rights than under uniform treatment, no matter whether sales are by single-price or by incentive-compatible auctions. 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Energy Planning & Policy- Environment, Health, & Safety</topic><topic>ALLOCATIONS</topic><topic>Auctions</topic><topic>Bidding</topic><topic>Biochemical oxygen demand</topic><topic>Case studies</topic><topic>Cost allocation</topic><topic>Cost efficiency</topic><topic>Cost incentives</topic><topic>ECONOMICS</topic><topic>ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY</topic><topic>environmental degradation</topic><topic>ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY</topic><topic>Environmental pollution</topic><topic>Environmental regulation</topic><topic>FINANCIAL INCENTIVES</topic><topic>GOVERNMENT POLICIES</topic><topic>LEGAL INCENTIVES</topic><topic>Payments</topic><topic>Phosphorus</topic><topic>Pollution</topic><topic>POLLUTION ABATEMENT</topic><topic>POLLUTION SOURCES</topic><topic>Procedures</topic><topic>Public policy</topic><topic>Rights</topic><topic>Simulation</topic><topic>Tradeoff analysis</topic><topic>waste management</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lyon, R.M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Univ. of Texas, Austin</creatorcontrib><collection>AGRIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 03</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 06</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 29</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - 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A range of alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights is examined. Using simulations based on realistic data from 2 water-pollution-control case studies, an investigation is conducted of rights programs based upon: 1. sales of rights by the government under 2 distinct types of auctions, and 2. free initial distribution of rights by the government to dischargers on some basis, followed by exchange among dischargers of rights and funds. It is suggested, based on both theoretical and practical considerations, that a basic trade-off exists between decreasing the financial burden of rights purchases and removing the incentives for strategic behavior. Very few dischargers in either case study would have lower expenses under government sales of rights than under uniform treatment, no matter whether sales are by single-price or by incentive-compatible auctions. In spite of some problems regarding incentive compatibility, the rights allocation approach of free distribution followed by exchange appears to offer the most desirable package of features. The incentive-compatible procedure may be optimal regarding such objectives as individual incentive compatibility and efficiency.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>University of Wisconsin Press</pub><doi>10.2307/3146074</doi><tpages>17</tpages></addata></record> |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0023-7639 |
| ispartof | Land Econ.; (United States), 1982-02, Vol.58 (1), p.16-32 |
| issn | 0023-7639 1543-8325 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_14151168 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | 290300 - Energy Planning & Policy- Environment, Health, & Safety ALLOCATIONS Auctions Bidding Biochemical oxygen demand Case studies Cost allocation Cost efficiency Cost incentives ECONOMICS ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY environmental degradation ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Environmental pollution Environmental regulation FINANCIAL INCENTIVES GOVERNMENT POLICIES LEGAL INCENTIVES Payments Phosphorus Pollution POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION SOURCES Procedures Public policy Rights Simulation Tradeoff analysis waste management |
| title | Auctions and alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights |
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