The complex stability of political equilibria
Stability in international and domestic politics may not depend on the existence of a unique equilibrium around which patterns of political behaviour can be coordinated. Instead, a complex stability may operate, based on a pattern of multiple simultaneous equilibria. This article explains how types...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Political Science 2012-12, Vol.64 (2), p.145-161 |
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| container_title | Political Science |
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| creator | Ayson, Robert |
| description | Stability in international and domestic politics may not depend on the existence of a unique equilibrium around which patterns of political behaviour can be coordinated. Instead, a complex stability may operate, based on a pattern of multiple simultaneous equilibria. This article explains how types of government, their foreign policy stances, the distribution of power between states, and international institutions can be regarded as four types of political equilibrium. With the help of findings from economics, game theory, biological sciences and complexity theory, it then examines the relevance of three successive levels of stability for these equilibrium types. The first level of stability refers to the preservation of a unique political equilibrium. The second refers to the capacity of the given political system to make a transition from one unique equilibrium to another. The third, complex stability, refers to patterns of oscillation between multiple simultaneous political equilibria. An attempt is also made to ameliorate the coordination problem which arises with multiple equilibria and comments are offered on the potential applications of these findings. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/0032318712466760 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Political Science, 2012-12, Vol.64 (2), p.145-161 |
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| language | eng |
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| subjects | Balance of power Bargaining theory Complex organization complexity Coordination Domestic affairs Domestic Politics Equilibrium Equilibrium models Evolutionary theory Foreign Policy Foreign policy foundations Game Theory Government structure International organizations International political economy Multi-level governance Policy co-ordination Political behaviour Political Power Political stability Political Systems Politics, Practical Preservation Regime transition Stability |
| title | The complex stability of political equilibria |
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