Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions
Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, "Protecting 'The Prize.' " OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker c...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Security studies 2013-01, Vol.22 (1), p.139-147 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 147 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 139 |
| container_title | Security studies |
| container_volume | 22 |
| creator | Gholz, Eugene Press, Daryl G. |
| description | Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, "Protecting 'The Prize.' " OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated claims of energy vulnerability distort U.S. national security policy. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/09636412.2013.757167 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1364697213</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2892578291</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-b3dbea208a612b8aafcfaf98cc34bd264e25805f25d40848af674c5a56e7a07c3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqN0c1KAzEUBeAgCtbqG7gYcONmav6TcSNSqxUqBdF1SDOJpE6TmsxQ-vZOqW5cSFd3850DlwPAJYIjBCW8gRUnnCI8whCRkWACcXEEBogxXiLJ8DEY7Ei5M6fgLOclhJggTgdATELdJR8-ilebfeNtMPa2mMZNMfdN8aLTp21zMdWhbmzx4HPq1q2PIZ-DE6ebbC9-7hC8P07extNyNn96Ht_PSkMJbcsFqRdWYyg1R3ghtXbGaVdJYwhd1JhTi5mEzGFWUyip1I4Laphm3AoNhSFDcL3vXaf41dncqpXPxjaNDjZ2WSEiCOWMMnYA5ZRXAiNyAEVUQCiqqqdXf-gydin0PyuEpagEZZT3iu6VSTHnZJ1aJ7_SaasQVLuN1O9GareR2m_Ux-72MR9cTCu9iampVau3TUwu6WB8VuTfhm9z7JVm</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1287974546</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions</title><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>Alma/SFX Local Collection</source><creator>Gholz, Eugene ; Press, Daryl G.</creator><creatorcontrib>Gholz, Eugene ; Press, Daryl G.</creatorcontrib><description>Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, "Protecting 'The Prize.' " OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated claims of energy vulnerability distort U.S. national security policy.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0963-6412</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1556-1852</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2013.757167</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London: Taylor & Francis Group</publisher><subject>Cartels ; Cheating ; Common Foreign and Security Policy ; Economic fluctuations ; Energy Policy ; Energy resources ; Enterprises ; Industry ; International Economic Organizations ; Markets ; Military ; National defense ; National Security ; Oil market ; Organization of petroleum exporting countries ; Petroleum ; Petroleum industry ; Petroleum production ; Power generation ; Production ; Production capacity ; U.S.A</subject><ispartof>Security studies, 2013-01, Vol.22 (1), p.139-147</ispartof><rights>Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 2013</rights><rights>Copyright Taylor & Francis Ltd. 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-b3dbea208a612b8aafcfaf98cc34bd264e25805f25d40848af674c5a56e7a07c3</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27863,27922,27923</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Gholz, Eugene</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Press, Daryl G.</creatorcontrib><title>Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions</title><title>Security studies</title><description>Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, "Protecting 'The Prize.' " OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated claims of energy vulnerability distort U.S. national security policy.</description><subject>Cartels</subject><subject>Cheating</subject><subject>Common Foreign and Security Policy</subject><subject>Economic fluctuations</subject><subject>Energy Policy</subject><subject>Energy resources</subject><subject>Enterprises</subject><subject>Industry</subject><subject>International Economic Organizations</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Military</subject><subject>National defense</subject><subject>National Security</subject><subject>Oil market</subject><subject>Organization of petroleum exporting countries</subject><subject>Petroleum</subject><subject>Petroleum industry</subject><subject>Petroleum production</subject><subject>Power generation</subject><subject>Production</subject><subject>Production capacity</subject><subject>U.S.A</subject><issn>0963-6412</issn><issn>1556-1852</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqN0c1KAzEUBeAgCtbqG7gYcONmav6TcSNSqxUqBdF1SDOJpE6TmsxQ-vZOqW5cSFd3850DlwPAJYIjBCW8gRUnnCI8whCRkWACcXEEBogxXiLJ8DEY7Ei5M6fgLOclhJggTgdATELdJR8-ilebfeNtMPa2mMZNMfdN8aLTp21zMdWhbmzx4HPq1q2PIZ-DE6ebbC9-7hC8P07extNyNn96Ht_PSkMJbcsFqRdWYyg1R3ghtXbGaVdJYwhd1JhTi5mEzGFWUyip1I4Laphm3AoNhSFDcL3vXaf41dncqpXPxjaNDjZ2WSEiCOWMMnYA5ZRXAiNyAEVUQCiqqqdXf-gydin0PyuEpagEZZT3iu6VSTHnZJ1aJ7_SaasQVLuN1O9GareR2m_Ux-72MR9cTCu9iampVau3TUwu6WB8VuTfhm9z7JVm</recordid><startdate>20130101</startdate><enddate>20130101</enddate><creator>Gholz, Eugene</creator><creator>Press, Daryl G.</creator><general>Taylor & Francis Group</general><general>Taylor & Francis Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K7.</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130101</creationdate><title>Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions</title><author>Gholz, Eugene ; Press, Daryl G.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-b3dbea208a612b8aafcfaf98cc34bd264e25805f25d40848af674c5a56e7a07c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Cartels</topic><topic>Cheating</topic><topic>Common Foreign and Security Policy</topic><topic>Economic fluctuations</topic><topic>Energy Policy</topic><topic>Energy resources</topic><topic>Enterprises</topic><topic>Industry</topic><topic>International Economic Organizations</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Military</topic><topic>National defense</topic><topic>National Security</topic><topic>Oil market</topic><topic>Organization of petroleum exporting countries</topic><topic>Petroleum</topic><topic>Petroleum industry</topic><topic>Petroleum production</topic><topic>Power generation</topic><topic>Production</topic><topic>Production capacity</topic><topic>U.S.A</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Gholz, Eugene</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Press, Daryl G.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Criminal Justice (Alumni)</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><jtitle>Security studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Gholz, Eugene</au><au>Press, Daryl G.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions</atitle><jtitle>Security studies</jtitle><date>2013-01-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>22</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>139</spage><epage>147</epage><pages>139-147</pages><issn>0963-6412</issn><eissn>1556-1852</eissn><abstract>Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, "Protecting 'The Prize.' " OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated claims of energy vulnerability distort U.S. national security policy.</abstract><cop>London</cop><pub>Taylor & Francis Group</pub><doi>10.1080/09636412.2013.757167</doi><tpages>9</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0963-6412 |
| ispartof | Security studies, 2013-01, Vol.22 (1), p.139-147 |
| issn | 0963-6412 1556-1852 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1364697213 |
| source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Cartels Cheating Common Foreign and Security Policy Economic fluctuations Energy Policy Energy resources Enterprises Industry International Economic Organizations Markets Military National defense National Security Oil market Organization of petroleum exporting countries Petroleum Petroleum industry Petroleum production Power generation Production Production capacity U.S.A |
| title | Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-14T04%3A23%3A08IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Enduring%20Resilience:%20How%20Oil%20Markets%20Handle%20Disruptions&rft.jtitle=Security%20studies&rft.au=Gholz,%20Eugene&rft.date=2013-01-01&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=139&rft.epage=147&rft.pages=139-147&rft.issn=0963-6412&rft.eissn=1556-1852&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080/09636412.2013.757167&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2892578291%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1287974546&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |