Charitable giving in the German welfare state: fiscal incentives and crowding out
There are two ways that government activities influence private charitable giving: (1) government spending on the provision of public goods may cause crowding out of private charitable contributions; and (2) tax incentives may boost private charitable giving. From a sample of German income tax retur...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2013-01, Vol.154 (1/2), p.39-58 |
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| creator | Bönke, Timm Massarrat-Mashhadi, Nima Sielaff, Christian |
| description | There are two ways that government activities influence private charitable giving: (1) government spending on the provision of public goods may cause crowding out of private charitable contributions; and (2) tax incentives may boost private charitable giving. From a sample of German income tax returns, we estimate the elasticity of charitable giving relative to tax incentives, income, and government spending. Using censored quantile regression analysis, we derive results for different points of the underlying distribution of charitable giving. Evaluating overall treasury efficiency, the tax deductibility of charitable donations fosters enough private giving to offset foregone tax revenues. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-011-9806-y |
| format | Article |
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From a sample of German income tax returns, we estimate the elasticity of charitable giving relative to tax incentives, income, and government spending. Using censored quantile regression analysis, we derive results for different points of the underlying distribution of charitable giving. 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From a sample of German income tax returns, we estimate the elasticity of charitable giving relative to tax incentives, income, and government spending. Using censored quantile regression analysis, we derive results for different points of the underlying distribution of charitable giving. Evaluating overall treasury efficiency, the tax deductibility of charitable donations fosters enough private giving to offset foregone tax revenues.</description><subject>Adjusted gross income</subject><subject>Altruism</subject><subject>Charitable giving</subject><subject>Charities</subject><subject>Charity</subject><subject>Contributions (Donations)</subject><subject>Crowding out</subject><subject>Crowding-out effect</subject><subject>Disposable income</subject><subject>Donations</subject><subject>Econometrics</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Efficiency</subject><subject>Elasticity of demand</subject><subject>Estimated taxes</subject><subject>Funding</subject><subject>Germany</subject><subject>Government Spending</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Income elasticity</subject><subject>Income estimates</subject><subject>Income Tax</subject><subject>Income tax returns</subject><subject>Income taxes</subject><subject>Personal income taxes</subject><subject>Political Science</subject><subject>Price elasticity</subject><subject>Public expenditure</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Public good</subject><subject>Public Goods</subject><subject>Regression Analysis</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tax incentives</subject><subject>Tax revenue</subject><subject>Taxable income</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>Welfare 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(2) tax incentives may boost private charitable giving. 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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Adjusted gross income Altruism Charitable giving Charities Charity Contributions (Donations) Crowding out Crowding-out effect Disposable income Donations Econometrics Economic models Economic theory Economics Economics and Finance Efficiency Elasticity of demand Estimated taxes Funding Germany Government Spending Incentives Income elasticity Income estimates Income Tax Income tax returns Income taxes Personal income taxes Political Science Price elasticity Public expenditure Public Finance Public good Public Goods Regression Analysis Studies Tax incentives Tax revenue Taxable income Taxation Welfare State |
| title | Charitable giving in the German welfare state: fiscal incentives and crowding out |
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