Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia
We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and uncertainty. When politicians' ability is ex ante unknown and policy choices are unobservable, elections improve political accountability and selection. However, incumb...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Economic journal (London) 2013-05, Vol.123 (568), p.373-400 |
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| container_title | The Economic journal (London) |
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| creator | Bonfiglioli, Alessandra Gancia, Gino |
| description | We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and uncertainty. When politicians' ability is ex ante unknown and policy choices are unobservable, elections improve political accountability and selection. However, incumbents underinvest in costly policies with future returns to signal high ability and increase re-election probability. Surprisingly, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may increase social welfare. We also address the socially optimal political rewards and the desirability of a one-term limit. Our predictions are consistent with several stylised facts and with a new empirical observation: aggregate uncertainty is positively correlated with fiscal discipline. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ecoj.12029 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current); Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Accountability CONFERENCE PAPERS Correlation analysis Decision making models Determinants Economic incentives Economic models Economic uncertainty Elections Electoral behaviour Financial investments Fiscal policy Fiscal theory Incumbents Political economy Political elections Political science Politicians Politics Signals Social welfare Studies Term limitations |
| title | Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia |
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