Does retailer power lead to exclusion?
This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007), who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Rand journal of economics 2013-03, Vol.44 (1), p.75-81 |
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| container_title | The Rand journal of economics |
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| creator | Rey, Patrick Whinston, Michael D. |
| description | This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007), who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit-maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/1756-2171.12011 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0741-6261 |
| ispartof | The Rand journal of economics, 2013-03, Vol.44 (1), p.75-81 |
| issn | 0741-6261 1756-2171 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Bargaining Bargaining power Distribution Equilibrium Fees Industrial market Manufactured products Manufacturers Manufacturing Nash equilibrium Options contracts Profit maximization Retail industries Retail stores Retail trade Retailing Studies Tariffs Vendor supplier relations Wholesale prices |
| title | Does retailer power lead to exclusion? |
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