Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a Corruption Game – An experimental analysis

► Experiment on corruption as a multi player coordination game. ► Participants can coordinate either towards corrupt or honest behavior. ► Risk attitudes concerning punishment in case of detection fail to explain behavior. ► Beliefs concerning the honesty of other participants predict the observed b...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic psychology 2013-02, Vol.34 (1), p.46-60
Hauptverfasser:	Berninghaus, Siegfried K., Haller, Sven, Krüger, Tyll, Neumann, Thomas, Schosser, Stephan, Vogt, Bodo
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Behavior Belief & doubt Beliefs Biological and medical sciences Corruption Economic behaviour Economic psychology Economic theory Experiment Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology Game theory Information analysis JEL classification: D73, K42, C91, C92 Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry Psychology. Psychophysiology PsycINFO classification: 4270 Risk attitude Social interactions. Communication. Group processes Social psychology Studies Uncertainty
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