Lying and team incentives
► We investigate the effect of individual piece-rates and team incentives on lying. ► We adapt the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). ► Lying is more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece rates. ► Subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they ca...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic psychology 2013-02, Vol.34 (1), p.1-7 |
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| container_title | Journal of economic psychology |
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| creator | Conrads, Julian Irlenbusch, Bernd Rilke, Rainer Michael Walkowitz, Gari |
| description | ► We investigate the effect of individual piece-rates and team incentives on lying. ► We adapt the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). ► Lying is more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece rates. ► Subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility. ► Subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion and Neuroticism lie more.
We investigate the influence of two popular compensation schemes on subjects’ inclination to lie by adapting an experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a fairly neglected feature of compensation schemes. Moreover, when disentangling different motives of the more pronounced unethical conduct under team incentives, we find that subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility, i.e., their deceptive acts cannot unambiguously be attributed to them individually. Our findings are robust even when controlling for individual difference variables. In both compensation schemes subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion, and high on Neuroticism tend to lie more. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.011 |
| format | Article |
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We investigate the influence of two popular compensation schemes on subjects’ inclination to lie by adapting an experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a fairly neglected feature of compensation schemes. Moreover, when disentangling different motives of the more pronounced unethical conduct under team incentives, we find that subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility, i.e., their deceptive acts cannot unambiguously be attributed to them individually. Our findings are robust even when controlling for individual difference variables. In both compensation schemes subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion, and high on Neuroticism tend to lie more.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0167-4870</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1872-7719</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.011</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JEPSDN</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Biological and medical sciences ; Cheating ; Compensation ; Compensation plans ; Compensation schemes ; Employment ; Experiment ; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology ; Group dynamics ; Incentives ; Individual differences ; Lying ; Professional misconduct ; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry ; Psychology. Psychophysiology ; Social interactions. Communication. Group processes ; Social psychology ; Studies ; Team ; Teamwork ; Work incentives</subject><ispartof>Journal of economic psychology, 2013-02, Vol.34 (1), p.1-7</ispartof><rights>2012 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>2015 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Feb 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c499t-a0b180c433df534de84ee6a037f3b33e2e593d7ea3be45a2297d99abd6163843</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c499t-a0b180c433df534de84ee6a037f3b33e2e593d7ea3be45a2297d99abd6163843</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.011$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3550,27924,27925,45995</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=26867649$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Conrads, Julian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Irlenbusch, Bernd</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rilke, Rainer Michael</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Walkowitz, Gari</creatorcontrib><title>Lying and team incentives</title><title>Journal of economic psychology</title><description>► We investigate the effect of individual piece-rates and team incentives on lying. ► We adapt the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). ► Lying is more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece rates. ► Subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility. ► Subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion and Neuroticism lie more.
We investigate the influence of two popular compensation schemes on subjects’ inclination to lie by adapting an experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a fairly neglected feature of compensation schemes. Moreover, when disentangling different motives of the more pronounced unethical conduct under team incentives, we find that subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility, i.e., their deceptive acts cannot unambiguously be attributed to them individually. Our findings are robust even when controlling for individual difference variables. In both compensation schemes subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion, and high on Neuroticism tend to lie more.</description><subject>Biological and medical sciences</subject><subject>Cheating</subject><subject>Compensation</subject><subject>Compensation plans</subject><subject>Compensation schemes</subject><subject>Employment</subject><subject>Experiment</subject><subject>Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology</subject><subject>Group dynamics</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Individual differences</subject><subject>Lying</subject><subject>Professional misconduct</subject><subject>Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry</subject><subject>Psychology. Psychophysiology</subject><subject>Social interactions. Communication. Group processes</subject><subject>Social psychology</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Team</subject><subject>Teamwork</subject><subject>Work incentives</subject><issn>0167-4870</issn><issn>1872-7719</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kMtKAzEUhoMoWKsPoKuCCG5mzG1yATdSvEHBTfchk5yRDNOZmkwLvr0ZWly4cHXg8P3_OXwI3RBcEkzEQ1u2A2xLignNixITcoJmRElaSEn0KZplSBZcSXyOLlJqMcYEV3KGrlffof9c2N4vRrCbRegd9GPYQ7pEZ43tElwd5xytX57Xy7di9fH6vnxaFY5rPRYW10RhxxnzTcW4B8UBhMVMNqxmDChUmnkJltXAK0upll5rW3tBBFOczdH9oXYbh68dpNFsQnLQdbaHYZcMYURWqqKVyOjtH7QddrHPzxlCFecUKyEzRQ-Ui0NKERqzjWFj47ch2EyyTGsmWWaSNe2yrBy6O1bb5GzXRNu7kH6TVORmwXXmHg8cZCP7ANEkFyA78yGCG40fwn9nfgDNGXyn</recordid><startdate>20130201</startdate><enddate>20130201</enddate><creator>Conrads, Julian</creator><creator>Irlenbusch, Bernd</creator><creator>Rilke, Rainer Michael</creator><creator>Walkowitz, Gari</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>IQODW</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130201</creationdate><title>Lying and team incentives</title><author>Conrads, Julian ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Rilke, Rainer Michael ; Walkowitz, Gari</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c499t-a0b180c433df534de84ee6a037f3b33e2e593d7ea3be45a2297d99abd6163843</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Biological and medical sciences</topic><topic>Cheating</topic><topic>Compensation</topic><topic>Compensation plans</topic><topic>Compensation schemes</topic><topic>Employment</topic><topic>Experiment</topic><topic>Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology</topic><topic>Group dynamics</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>Individual differences</topic><topic>Lying</topic><topic>Professional misconduct</topic><topic>Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry</topic><topic>Psychology. Psychophysiology</topic><topic>Social interactions. Communication. 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We investigate the influence of two popular compensation schemes on subjects’ inclination to lie by adapting an experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a fairly neglected feature of compensation schemes. Moreover, when disentangling different motives of the more pronounced unethical conduct under team incentives, we find that subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility, i.e., their deceptive acts cannot unambiguously be attributed to them individually. Our findings are robust even when controlling for individual difference variables. In both compensation schemes subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion, and high on Neuroticism tend to lie more.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.011</doi><tpages>7</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| language | eng |
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| source | ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Biological and medical sciences Cheating Compensation Compensation plans Compensation schemes Employment Experiment Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology Group dynamics Incentives Individual differences Lying Professional misconduct Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry Psychology. Psychophysiology Social interactions. Communication. Group processes Social psychology Studies Team Teamwork Work incentives |
| title | Lying and team incentives |
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