Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions

“Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not...

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Veröffentlicht in:Political analysis 2012-10, Vol.20 (4), p.520-524
1. Verfasser: Cameron, Charles M.
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description “Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not in the models but in the tests. Understanding why the tests miss the mark is helpful in understanding models of veto politics, and more generally in thinking about testing strategies when multiple models analyze different causal mechanisms that hold under different circumstances. I should note immediately that the effort in the paper to think hard about override rates is admirable; it simply does not go far enough.
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source EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Cambridge Journals Online; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR
subjects Audiences
Bilateralism
Blame
Boundaries
Boundary conditions
Interaction
Modeling
Negotiation
Political analysis
Political behavior
Political science
Political theory
Presidency
Presidential powers
Veto
Vetoes
title Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions
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