Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions
“Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Political analysis 2012-10, Vol.20 (4), p.520-524 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 524 |
---|---|
container_issue | 4 |
container_start_page | 520 |
container_title | Political analysis |
container_volume | 20 |
creator | Cameron, Charles M. |
description | “Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not in the models but in the tests. Understanding why the tests miss the mark is helpful in understanding models of veto politics, and more generally in thinking about testing strategies when multiple models analyze different causal mechanisms that hold under different circumstances. I should note immediately that the effort in the paper to think hard about override rates is admirable; it simply does not go far enough. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/pan/mps029 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1266148182</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><cupid>10_1093_pan_mps029</cupid><jstor_id>23359645</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>23359645</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-6ac3609af424d59786bc557c6763b9da89953cda2733aeefe3819f8992c7230f3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNplkM1LxDAQxYMouK5evAsFL6JbN5O0-Ti6i1-w4EW9hmyaLl22SU3ag_-9kS4iepph5sebNw-hc8C3gCWdd9rN2y5iIg_QBArO8kIKeZh6XPAcpODH6CTGLcbAuZQTdPNue2_jLFvosNGNa9xmlmlXZQs_uEqHz2zpXdX0jXfxFB3Vehft2b5O0dvD_evyKV-9PD4v71a5oSX0OdOGMix1XZCiKiUXbG3KkhvGGV3LSgspS2oqTTil2traUgGyTlNiOKG4plN0Nep2wX8MNvaqbaKxu5121g9RAWEMCgGCJPTyD7r1Q3DJnQIAgqmgwBN1PVIm-BiDrVUXmjY9pwCr79xUyk2NuSX4YoS3sffhhySUlpIVZdrP9mK6XYem2thfN__LfQGMFXfP</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1112038317</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions</title><source>EBSCOhost Political Science Complete</source><source>Cambridge Journals Online</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>JSTOR</source><creator>Cameron, Charles M.</creator><creatorcontrib>Cameron, Charles M.</creatorcontrib><description>“Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not in the models but in the tests. Understanding why the tests miss the mark is helpful in understanding models of veto politics, and more generally in thinking about testing strategies when multiple models analyze different causal mechanisms that hold under different circumstances. I should note immediately that the effort in the paper to think hard about override rates is admirable; it simply does not go far enough.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1047-1987</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1476-4989</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/pan/mps029</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York, US: Cambridge University Press</publisher><subject>Audiences ; Bilateralism ; Blame ; Boundaries ; Boundary conditions ; Interaction ; Modeling ; Negotiation ; Political analysis ; Political behavior ; Political science ; Political theory ; Presidency ; Presidential powers ; Veto ; Vetoes</subject><ispartof>Political analysis, 2012-10, Vol.20 (4), p.520-524</ispartof><rights>Copyright © The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology</rights><rights>2012 The Society for Political Methodology</rights><rights>Copyright Oxford Publishing Limited(England) Autumn 2012</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-6ac3609af424d59786bc557c6763b9da89953cda2733aeefe3819f8992c7230f3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-6ac3609af424d59786bc557c6763b9da89953cda2733aeefe3819f8992c7230f3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23359645$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S104719870001319X/type/journal_article$$EHTML$$P50$$Gcambridge$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>164,314,780,784,803,27924,27925,55628,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Cameron, Charles M.</creatorcontrib><title>Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions</title><title>Political analysis</title><addtitle>Polit. anal</addtitle><description>“Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not in the models but in the tests. Understanding why the tests miss the mark is helpful in understanding models of veto politics, and more generally in thinking about testing strategies when multiple models analyze different causal mechanisms that hold under different circumstances. I should note immediately that the effort in the paper to think hard about override rates is admirable; it simply does not go far enough.</description><subject>Audiences</subject><subject>Bilateralism</subject><subject>Blame</subject><subject>Boundaries</subject><subject>Boundary conditions</subject><subject>Interaction</subject><subject>Modeling</subject><subject>Negotiation</subject><subject>Political analysis</subject><subject>Political behavior</subject><subject>Political science</subject><subject>Political theory</subject><subject>Presidency</subject><subject>Presidential powers</subject><subject>Veto</subject><subject>Vetoes</subject><issn>1047-1987</issn><issn>1476-4989</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNplkM1LxDAQxYMouK5evAsFL6JbN5O0-Ti6i1-w4EW9hmyaLl22SU3ag_-9kS4iepph5sebNw-hc8C3gCWdd9rN2y5iIg_QBArO8kIKeZh6XPAcpODH6CTGLcbAuZQTdPNue2_jLFvosNGNa9xmlmlXZQs_uEqHz2zpXdX0jXfxFB3Vehft2b5O0dvD_evyKV-9PD4v71a5oSX0OdOGMix1XZCiKiUXbG3KkhvGGV3LSgspS2oqTTil2traUgGyTlNiOKG4plN0Nep2wX8MNvaqbaKxu5121g9RAWEMCgGCJPTyD7r1Q3DJnQIAgqmgwBN1PVIm-BiDrVUXmjY9pwCr79xUyk2NuSX4YoS3sffhhySUlpIVZdrP9mK6XYem2thfN__LfQGMFXfP</recordid><startdate>201210</startdate><enddate>201210</enddate><creator>Cameron, Charles M.</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><general>The University of Michigan Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201210</creationdate><title>Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions</title><author>Cameron, Charles M.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-6ac3609af424d59786bc557c6763b9da89953cda2733aeefe3819f8992c7230f3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Audiences</topic><topic>Bilateralism</topic><topic>Blame</topic><topic>Boundaries</topic><topic>Boundary conditions</topic><topic>Interaction</topic><topic>Modeling</topic><topic>Negotiation</topic><topic>Political analysis</topic><topic>Political behavior</topic><topic>Political science</topic><topic>Political theory</topic><topic>Presidency</topic><topic>Presidential powers</topic><topic>Veto</topic><topic>Vetoes</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Cameron, Charles M.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>Political analysis</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Cameron, Charles M.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions</atitle><jtitle>Political analysis</jtitle><addtitle>Polit. anal</addtitle><date>2012-10</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>20</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>520</spage><epage>524</epage><pages>520-524</pages><issn>1047-1987</issn><eissn>1476-4989</eissn><abstract>“Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates” (henceforth “Veto Override Rates”) offers several tests of two models of vetoes and finds the models wanting. The paper concludes that something is seriously amiss with the models. In my view, the problem lies not in the models but in the tests. Understanding why the tests miss the mark is helpful in understanding models of veto politics, and more generally in thinking about testing strategies when multiple models analyze different causal mechanisms that hold under different circumstances. I should note immediately that the effort in the paper to think hard about override rates is admirable; it simply does not go far enough.</abstract><cop>New York, US</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/pan/mps029</doi><tpages>5</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 1047-1987 |
ispartof | Political analysis, 2012-10, Vol.20 (4), p.520-524 |
issn | 1047-1987 1476-4989 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1266148182 |
source | EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Cambridge Journals Online; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR |
subjects | Audiences Bilateralism Blame Boundaries Boundary conditions Interaction Modeling Negotiation Political analysis Political behavior Political science Political theory Presidency Presidential powers Veto Vetoes |
title | Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-01T07%3A15%3A46IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Vetoes,%20Bargaining,%20and%20Boundary%20Conditions&rft.jtitle=Political%20analysis&rft.au=Cameron,%20Charles%20M.&rft.date=2012-10&rft.volume=20&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=520&rft.epage=524&rft.pages=520-524&rft.issn=1047-1987&rft.eissn=1476-4989&rft_id=info:doi/10.1093/pan/mps029&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E23359645%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1112038317&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_cupid=10_1093_pan_mps029&rft_jstor_id=23359645&rfr_iscdi=true |