DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF
The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those who are weak...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of the European Economic Association 2011-10, Vol.9 (5), p.903-930 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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