Law theory can be value-free?
This paper argues so-called value neutrality thesis in Legal Theory in the sense that, beyond epistemic values, it does not involve moral or political values. In order to defend this thesis, it will deal first with the meaning of the classical formulation in Legal Theory of the 19th and 20th centuri...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Derechos y Libertades 2011-01 (24), p.93-118 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | spa |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper argues so-called value neutrality thesis in Legal Theory in the sense that, beyond epistemic values, it does not involve moral or political values. In order to defend this thesis, it will deal first with the meaning of the classical formulation in Legal Theory of the 19th and 20th centuries. Secondly, it will tackle criticisms of the classical formulation having as spotlight the role of epistemic values. Finally, focusing on the current discussion within the Legal Theory, it shall be considered the role of practical values and the question whether it is possible or not continue the thesis that the Legal Theory can be free of moral and political values. Adapted from the source document. |
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ISSN: | 1133-0937 1133-0937 |