Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
We examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. In unconditional tests, we find that fund families support management when they have pension ties to the firm. We find no relation...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 2012-06, Vol.47 (3), p.567-588 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 588 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 567 |
| container_title | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis |
| container_volume | 47 |
| creator | Ashraf, Rasha Jayaraman, Narayanan Ryan, Harley E. |
| description | We examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. In unconditional tests, we find that fund families support management when they have pension ties to the firm. We find no relation when we stratify by fund family in conditional tests, which suggests that fund families with pension ties vote with management at both client and nonclient firms. We confirm this result in an analysis of nonclient firms. Overall, our results suggest that pension-related business ties influence fund families to vote with management at all firms. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S0022109012000014 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1205725713</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><cupid>10_1017_S0022109012000014</cupid><jstor_id>41653560</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>41653560</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-bd34cdf878ff48a04574f6d9ebe90a11f1e6e38e9773dd8d65aa009cf05bbec33</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kU9L5TAUxYOM4Bv1A7gQArNxUydp06ZdDfp8zghPFP9tS9rcaB5t8kwaeW795KbzREHxbu7i_M45IRehPUoOKaH89zUhaUpJRWhK4lC2gSaU50VSVLT4gSajnIz6Fvrp_WJk0pRM0MuJxZdgvLYmuYJODCDxcfDagPf4RoPHZ0Z1AUwL-DwMQXT4NBiJL51dPeM7O2hz_wfPnrT8jyhne3z9IBw82E6CG7ml9aLz2Bo8W0EbBv0EeGr7ZWwVQ-zdQZsqArD7trfR7ensZvovmV_8PZsezZOWlWxIGpmxVqqSl0qxUhCWc6YKWUEDFRGUKgoFZCVUnGdSlrLIhSCkahXJmwbaLNtGB-vcpbOPAfxQ99q30HXCgA2-jj-X8zTndER_fUIXNjgTX1envOSUcc5ZpOiaap313oGql073wj3XlNTjVeovV4me_bVn4Qfr3g2MFnmWFyTq2Vum6Bun5T18VH-f-gq1iZl_</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2787147774</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation</title><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>Cambridge University Press Journals Complete</source><creator>Ashraf, Rasha ; Jayaraman, Narayanan ; Ryan, Harley E.</creator><creatorcontrib>Ashraf, Rasha ; Jayaraman, Narayanan ; Ryan, Harley E.</creatorcontrib><description>We examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. In unconditional tests, we find that fund families support management when they have pension ties to the firm. We find no relation when we stratify by fund family in conditional tests, which suggests that fund families with pension ties vote with management at both client and nonclient firms. We confirm this result in an analysis of nonclient firms. Overall, our results suggest that pension-related business ties influence fund families to vote with management at all firms.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-1090</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1756-6916</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1017/S0022109012000014</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York, USA: Cambridge University Press</publisher><subject>Business structures ; Chief executive officers ; Common stock ; Companies ; Compensation ; Executive compensation ; Executives ; Investment trusts ; Mutual funds ; Pension funds ; Public relations ; Recommendations ; Shareholders ; Shares outstanding ; Stockholders ; Voting ; Voting intentions</subject><ispartof>Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 2012-06, Vol.47 (3), p.567-588</ispartof><rights>Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2012</rights><rights>Copyright 2012, Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-bd34cdf878ff48a04574f6d9ebe90a11f1e6e38e9773dd8d65aa009cf05bbec33</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-bd34cdf878ff48a04574f6d9ebe90a11f1e6e38e9773dd8d65aa009cf05bbec33</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41653560$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022109012000014/type/journal_article$$EHTML$$P50$$Gcambridge$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>164,314,780,784,803,27924,27925,55628,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Ashraf, Rasha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jayaraman, Narayanan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ryan, Harley E.</creatorcontrib><title>Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation</title><title>Journal of financial and quantitative analysis</title><addtitle>J. Financ. Quant. Anal</addtitle><description>We examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. In unconditional tests, we find that fund families support management when they have pension ties to the firm. We find no relation when we stratify by fund family in conditional tests, which suggests that fund families with pension ties vote with management at both client and nonclient firms. We confirm this result in an analysis of nonclient firms. Overall, our results suggest that pension-related business ties influence fund families to vote with management at all firms.</description><subject>Business structures</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>Common stock</subject><subject>Companies</subject><subject>Compensation</subject><subject>Executive compensation</subject><subject>Executives</subject><subject>Investment trusts</subject><subject>Mutual funds</subject><subject>Pension funds</subject><subject>Public relations</subject><subject>Recommendations</subject><subject>Shareholders</subject><subject>Shares outstanding</subject><subject>Stockholders</subject><subject>Voting</subject><subject>Voting intentions</subject><issn>0022-1090</issn><issn>1756-6916</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kU9L5TAUxYOM4Bv1A7gQArNxUydp06ZdDfp8zghPFP9tS9rcaB5t8kwaeW795KbzREHxbu7i_M45IRehPUoOKaH89zUhaUpJRWhK4lC2gSaU50VSVLT4gSajnIz6Fvrp_WJk0pRM0MuJxZdgvLYmuYJODCDxcfDagPf4RoPHZ0Z1AUwL-DwMQXT4NBiJL51dPeM7O2hz_wfPnrT8jyhne3z9IBw82E6CG7ml9aLz2Bo8W0EbBv0EeGr7ZWwVQ-zdQZsqArD7trfR7ensZvovmV_8PZsezZOWlWxIGpmxVqqSl0qxUhCWc6YKWUEDFRGUKgoFZCVUnGdSlrLIhSCkahXJmwbaLNtGB-vcpbOPAfxQ99q30HXCgA2-jj-X8zTndER_fUIXNjgTX1envOSUcc5ZpOiaap313oGql073wj3XlNTjVeovV4me_bVn4Qfr3g2MFnmWFyTq2Vum6Bun5T18VH-f-gq1iZl_</recordid><startdate>20120601</startdate><enddate>20120601</enddate><creator>Ashraf, Rasha</creator><creator>Jayaraman, Narayanan</creator><creator>Ryan, Harley E.</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X1</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8A9</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ANIOZ</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRAZJ</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>S0X</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120601</creationdate><title>Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation</title><author>Ashraf, Rasha ; Jayaraman, Narayanan ; Ryan, Harley E.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-bd34cdf878ff48a04574f6d9ebe90a11f1e6e38e9773dd8d65aa009cf05bbec33</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Business structures</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>Common stock</topic><topic>Companies</topic><topic>Compensation</topic><topic>Executive compensation</topic><topic>Executives</topic><topic>Investment trusts</topic><topic>Mutual funds</topic><topic>Pension funds</topic><topic>Public relations</topic><topic>Recommendations</topic><topic>Shareholders</topic><topic>Shares outstanding</topic><topic>Stockholders</topic><topic>Voting</topic><topic>Voting intentions</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Ashraf, Rasha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jayaraman, Narayanan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ryan, Harley E.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Accounting & Tax Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Accounting & Tax Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Accounting, Tax & Banking Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Accounting, Tax & Banking Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>SIRS Editorial</collection><jtitle>Journal of financial and quantitative analysis</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Ashraf, Rasha</au><au>Jayaraman, Narayanan</au><au>Ryan, Harley E.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation</atitle><jtitle>Journal of financial and quantitative analysis</jtitle><addtitle>J. Financ. Quant. Anal</addtitle><date>2012-06-01</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>47</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>567</spage><epage>588</epage><pages>567-588</pages><issn>0022-1090</issn><eissn>1756-6916</eissn><abstract>We examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. In unconditional tests, we find that fund families support management when they have pension ties to the firm. We find no relation when we stratify by fund family in conditional tests, which suggests that fund families with pension ties vote with management at both client and nonclient firms. We confirm this result in an analysis of nonclient firms. Overall, our results suggest that pension-related business ties influence fund families to vote with management at all firms.</abstract><cop>New York, USA</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1017/S0022109012000014</doi><tpages>22</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0022-1090 |
| ispartof | Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 2012-06, Vol.47 (3), p.567-588 |
| issn | 0022-1090 1756-6916 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1205725713 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete |
| subjects | Business structures Chief executive officers Common stock Companies Compensation Executive compensation Executives Investment trusts Mutual funds Pension funds Public relations Recommendations Shareholders Shares outstanding Stockholders Voting Voting intentions |
| title | Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-20T04%3A44%3A01IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Do%20Pension-Related%20Business%20Ties%20Influence%20Mutual%20Fund%20Proxy%20Voting?%20Evidence%20from%20Shareholder%20Proposals%20on%20Executive%20Compensation&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20financial%20and%20quantitative%20analysis&rft.au=Ashraf,%20Rasha&rft.date=2012-06-01&rft.volume=47&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=567&rft.epage=588&rft.pages=567-588&rft.issn=0022-1090&rft.eissn=1756-6916&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S0022109012000014&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E41653560%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2787147774&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_cupid=10_1017_S0022109012000014&rft_jstor_id=41653560&rfr_iscdi=true |