Dynamic legislative policy making

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume pref...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic theory 2012-09, Vol.147 (5), p.1653-1688
Hauptverfasser:	Duggan, John, Kalandrakis, Tasos
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bargaining Convergence Core Dynamic game Economic policy Economic theory Economics Equilibrium Equilibrium models Game theory Games Invariants Legislature Markov analysis Markovian processes Mathematical analysis Policies Policy making Spatial models Stationary equilibrium Strategy Studies Utilities
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