Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism
In this paper we extend the results on ex-ante agreeable trade of Kajii and Ui [Kajii, A., Ui, T., 2006. Agreeable bets with multiple priors. Journal of Economic Theory 128, 299–305] to the case of non-convex Choquet preferences. We discuss the economic relevance of the main result for the existence...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Mathematical social sciences 2012-09, Vol.64 (2), p.119-126 |
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| creator | Dominiak, Adam Eichberger, Jürgen Lefort, Jean-Philippe |
| description | In this paper we extend the results on ex-ante agreeable trade of Kajii and Ui [Kajii, A., Ui, T., 2006. Agreeable bets with multiple priors. Journal of Economic Theory 128, 299–305] to the case of non-convex Choquet preferences. We discuss the economic relevance of the main result for the existence of speculative trade under ambiguity. Following Haller [Haller, H., 1990. Non-market reopening, time-consistent plans and the structure of intertemporal preferences. Economics Letters 32, 1–5] we also elaborate the relevance of updating preferences upon arrival of public information for the potential of re-contracting initial contingent claims.
► It is shown that both optimism and pessimism are important for speculative trade. ► We assumed that traders have not-necessary convex Choquet preferences. ► Necessary and sufficient conditions for ex ante agreeable trade are provided. ► The role of updating non-additive beliefs in face of public information is elaborated. ► Under the Full-Bayesian updating rule there will be no interim agreeable trade. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.006 |
| format | Article |
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► It is shown that both optimism and pessimism are important for speculative trade. ► We assumed that traders have not-necessary convex Choquet preferences. ► Necessary and sufficient conditions for ex ante agreeable trade are provided. ► The role of updating non-additive beliefs in face of public information is elaborated. ► Under the Full-Bayesian updating rule there will be no interim agreeable trade.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0165-4896</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1879-3118</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.006</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Economic theory ; Game theory ; Optimism ; Pessimism ; Preferences ; Trade agreements</subject><ispartof>Mathematical social sciences, 2012-09, Vol.64 (2), p.119-126</ispartof><rights>2012 Elsevier B.V.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c415t-52e914e8ff30c554e393cc74b9e0a49d1edd2868759d73a4e10167d578b0ab7c3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c415t-52e914e8ff30c554e393cc74b9e0a49d1edd2868759d73a4e10167d578b0ab7c3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489612000285$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,27901,27902,65306</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Dominiak, Adam</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Eichberger, Jürgen</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lefort, Jean-Philippe</creatorcontrib><title>Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism</title><title>Mathematical social sciences</title><description>In this paper we extend the results on ex-ante agreeable trade of Kajii and Ui [Kajii, A., Ui, T., 2006. Agreeable bets with multiple priors. Journal of Economic Theory 128, 299–305] to the case of non-convex Choquet preferences. We discuss the economic relevance of the main result for the existence of speculative trade under ambiguity. Following Haller [Haller, H., 1990. Non-market reopening, time-consistent plans and the structure of intertemporal preferences. Economics Letters 32, 1–5] we also elaborate the relevance of updating preferences upon arrival of public information for the potential of re-contracting initial contingent claims.
► It is shown that both optimism and pessimism are important for speculative trade. ► We assumed that traders have not-necessary convex Choquet preferences. ► Necessary and sufficient conditions for ex ante agreeable trade are provided. ► The role of updating non-additive beliefs in face of public information is elaborated. ► Under the Full-Bayesian updating rule there will be no interim agreeable trade.</description><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Optimism</subject><subject>Pessimism</subject><subject>Preferences</subject><subject>Trade agreements</subject><issn>0165-4896</issn><issn>1879-3118</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkEtLxDAUhYMoOD7-Q5eCtN40SZMsx8EXDLjRdUiTWydDZ1qTjuK_N-MILl1dDnznXM4hpKBQUaDNzbra2GmVBpdcqGqgdQWsAmiOyIwqqUtGqToms4yKkivdnJKzlNYAIDM8I9fzt4ho2x6LKVqPxWeYVsUwTmET0qawW1-MmNKPuiAnne0TXv7ec_J6f_eyeCyXzw9Pi_mydJyKqRQ1aspRdR0DJwRHpplzkrcawXLtKXpfq0ZJob1kluO-h_RCqhZsKx07J1eH3DEO7ztMk8nfHfa93eKwS4aC5I1oNLCMqgPq4pBSxM6MMWxs_MqQ2eeatfnbx-z3McBM3idbbw9WzFU-AkaTCdw69CGim4wfwv8h3yJYct4</recordid><startdate>20120901</startdate><enddate>20120901</enddate><creator>Dominiak, Adam</creator><creator>Eichberger, Jürgen</creator><creator>Lefort, Jean-Philippe</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120901</creationdate><title>Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism</title><author>Dominiak, Adam ; Eichberger, Jürgen ; Lefort, Jean-Philippe</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c415t-52e914e8ff30c554e393cc74b9e0a49d1edd2868759d73a4e10167d578b0ab7c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Optimism</topic><topic>Pessimism</topic><topic>Preferences</topic><topic>Trade agreements</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Dominiak, Adam</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Eichberger, Jürgen</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lefort, Jean-Philippe</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Mathematical social sciences</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Dominiak, Adam</au><au>Eichberger, Jürgen</au><au>Lefort, Jean-Philippe</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism</atitle><jtitle>Mathematical social sciences</jtitle><date>2012-09-01</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>64</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>119</spage><epage>126</epage><pages>119-126</pages><issn>0165-4896</issn><eissn>1879-3118</eissn><abstract>In this paper we extend the results on ex-ante agreeable trade of Kajii and Ui [Kajii, A., Ui, T., 2006. Agreeable bets with multiple priors. Journal of Economic Theory 128, 299–305] to the case of non-convex Choquet preferences. We discuss the economic relevance of the main result for the existence of speculative trade under ambiguity. Following Haller [Haller, H., 1990. Non-market reopening, time-consistent plans and the structure of intertemporal preferences. Economics Letters 32, 1–5] we also elaborate the relevance of updating preferences upon arrival of public information for the potential of re-contracting initial contingent claims.
► It is shown that both optimism and pessimism are important for speculative trade. ► We assumed that traders have not-necessary convex Choquet preferences. ► Necessary and sufficient conditions for ex ante agreeable trade are provided. ► The role of updating non-additive beliefs in face of public information is elaborated. ► Under the Full-Bayesian updating rule there will be no interim agreeable trade.</abstract><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.006</doi><tpages>8</tpages></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Economic theory Game theory Optimism Pessimism Preferences Trade agreements |
| title | Agreeable trade with optimism and pessimism |
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