Planning for war: The red army and the catastrophe of 1941
Unlike Stalin, the USSR's top military officials expected and attempted to prepare for Nazi invasion, but underestimated the striking power of the German army. The vulnerability of Soviet forces in forward positions was increased by the disconnection between political strategy and military oper...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Europe-Asia studies 1995-12, Vol.47 (8), p.1293-1326 |
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| container_title | Europe-Asia studies |
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| creator | Roberts, Cynthia A. |
| description | Unlike Stalin, the USSR's top military officials expected and attempted to prepare for Nazi invasion, but underestimated the striking power of the German army. The vulnerability of Soviet forces in forward positions was increased by the disconnection between political strategy and military operational doctrine, and had been perilously weakened by military purges since 1937. Using previously untapped archival records identifies misconceptions in the Red Army's core planning assumptions, including underestimating the impact of blitzkrieg in the teeth of recent evidence in the West, and overestimating Red Army strength. The roots of the failure to comprehend the initial period of war lay in the organisational ideology of the Red Army which emerged in the 1920s, leading to an offensive bias in military strategy. This view challenges traditional explanations of the disaster of 1941 that focus on Stalin and totalitarianism. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/09668139508412322 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Europe-Asia studies, 1995-12, Vol.47 (8), p.1293-1326 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Political Science Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Armies Army Blitzkrieg Defence policy Germany Invasion Military doctrines Military operations Military strategy Military tactics Planning Political history U.S.S.R USSR War War planning Warfare World War II World War Two |
| title | Planning for war: The red army and the catastrophe of 1941 |
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