Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure
Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-o...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial economics 2012-04, Vol.104 (1), p.1-22 |
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| container_title | Journal of financial economics |
| container_volume | 104 |
| creator | Lin, Chen Ma, Yue Malatesta, Paul Xuan, Yuhai |
| description | Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.006 |
| format | Article |
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When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. 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We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises.</description><subject>Bank loans</subject><subject>Borrowing</subject><subject>Business ownership</subject><subject>Cash flow</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Corporate planning</subject><subject>Due diligence</subject><subject>Economic structure</subject><subject>Excess control rights</subject><subject>Firm theory</subject><subject>Ownership and control</subject><subject>Ownership structure</subject><subject>Participating loans</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Syndicated loans</subject><issn>0304-405X</issn><issn>1879-2774</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkEtLxDAUhYMoOI7-BKG4ctMxaR5NV4MMvmDAjYK7kKa3mDqT1KRV5t-bMoMLN97Nhct3DucehC4JXhBMxE236FrrwPhFgQlJtwXG4gjNiCyrvChLdoxmmGKWM8zfTtFZjB1OU_JqhpYrH3of9ACZ_3YQ4rvtsziE0QxjgEy7Jqu1-8g2Xrss7lxjzcT-EufopNWbCBeHPUev93cvq8d8_fzwtLpd54aV1ZCXpeCUa6GpZBIYFpwTUQCTtK6ZaZjklYSWy8LQlqZgTd1imYC6YbwSmtA5ut779sF_jhAHtbXRwGajHfgxKoIpLaTgrEzo1R-082NwKZ2qCo4rWUmRIL6HTPAxBmhVH-xWh11yUlOrqlOHVtXU6nROrSbdcq-D9OyXhaCiseAMNDaAGVTj7T8OP0JugiI</recordid><startdate>20120401</startdate><enddate>20120401</enddate><creator>Lin, Chen</creator><creator>Ma, Yue</creator><creator>Malatesta, Paul</creator><creator>Xuan, Yuhai</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120401</creationdate><title>Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure</title><author>Lin, Chen ; Ma, Yue ; Malatesta, Paul ; Xuan, Yuhai</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c479t-776535a6a3848e40655162e483bb4cd48598ef582c3f3759dbf0862ebd4596a13</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Bank loans</topic><topic>Borrowing</topic><topic>Business ownership</topic><topic>Cash flow</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Corporate planning</topic><topic>Due diligence</topic><topic>Economic structure</topic><topic>Excess control rights</topic><topic>Firm theory</topic><topic>Ownership and control</topic><topic>Ownership structure</topic><topic>Participating loans</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Syndicated loans</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lin, Chen</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ma, Yue</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Malatesta, Paul</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xuan, Yuhai</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of financial economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Lin, Chen</au><au>Ma, Yue</au><au>Malatesta, Paul</au><au>Xuan, Yuhai</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure</atitle><jtitle>Journal of financial economics</jtitle><date>2012-04-01</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>104</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>22</epage><pages>1-22</pages><issn>0304-405X</issn><eissn>1879-2774</eissn><coden>JFECDT</coden><abstract>Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0304-405X |
| ispartof | Journal of financial economics, 2012-04, Vol.104 (1), p.1-22 |
| issn | 0304-405X 1879-2774 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1033286547 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Bank loans Borrowing Business ownership Cash flow Corporate governance Corporate planning Due diligence Economic structure Excess control rights Firm theory Ownership and control Ownership structure Participating loans Studies Syndicated loans |
| title | Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure |
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