Contract Form, Wage Flexibility, and Employment

We begin with two uncontroversial hypotheses - firm productivity is expensive to measure and employment entails relationship-specific investments. These assumptions imply that firms would optimally choose fixed-wage contracts, and complement these with bonus pay when measuring employee performance i...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The American economic review 2012-05, Vol.102 (3), p.526-531
Hauptverfasser:	Lemieux, Thomas, MacLeod, W. Bentley, Parent, Daniel
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Business investment CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNEMPLOYMENT: NEW MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE AND PERSPECTIVES Contracts Demand shocks Economic theory Employers Employment Employment contracts Financial investments Flexibility Industrial productivity Information asymmetry Job performance Labor market Labor markets Labour contract Monitoring costs Productivity Unemployment Wage rates Wages Wages & salaries Workers
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