Insurance in vertically differentiated repair markets
In vertically differentiated repair markets with insured customers, insurance coverage increases price level, entry, and the high quality provider’s profits. In the market for pharmaceuticals, this should be taken into account when calculating the extent of patent periods. ► An incumbent faces entry...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 2012-07, Vol.116 (1), p.121-123 |
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| container_end_page | 123 |
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| container_title | Economics letters |
| container_volume | 116 |
| creator | Urmann, Oliver |
| description | In vertically differentiated repair markets with insured customers, insurance coverage increases price level, entry, and the high quality provider’s profits. In the market for pharmaceuticals, this should be taken into account when calculating the extent of patent periods.
► An incumbent faces entry by competitors in a market with insured consumers. ► Insurance coverage increases price level, entry and the incumbent’s profits. ► Ex post moral hazard increases entry and profits but does not affect the price level. ► Results should be considered when calculating patent periods for brand-name drugs. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.02.004 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0165-1765 |
| ispartof | Economics letters, 2012-07, Vol.116 (1), p.121-123 |
| issn | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1023194624 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Insurance Insurance coverage Market structure Pharmaceuticals Price level Price levels Repair & maintenance services Repair markets Studies Vertical differentiation |
| title | Insurance in vertically differentiated repair markets |
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