Capital-Accumulation Games under Environmental Regulation and Duopolistic Competition

In a differential game between two symmetric firms, provided with a clean and a dirty production activity, it is analyzed how investment and emissions are affected by environmental regulation. If both firms face the same environmental policy, a stricter policy reduces long-run investment in the dirt...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 1999-01, Vol.69 (3), p.267-287
1. Verfasser:	Stimming, Martina
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Capital depreciation Capital investments Capital stock Capital stocks Competition Economic theory Emission charges Emissions Emissions policy Emissions reduction Emissions regulations Environmental policy Environmental regulations Financial investments Investment policy Investments Marginal costs Outdoor air quality Permits Pollutant emissions Production costs Quality improvement Tax rates Taxes
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