Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation

This paper combines dynamic social choice and strategic experimentation to study the following question: How does a society, a committee, or, more generally, a group of individuals with potentially heterogeneous preferences, experiment with new opportunities? Each voter recognizes that, during exper...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 2010-05, Vol.78 (3), p.933-971
1. Verfasser:	Strulovici, Bruno
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Applications Backward induction bandit Banditry Biology, psychology, social sciences Exact sciences and technology Experimentation Externality Game theory Group size Insurance, economics, finance Learning Lump sum payments Majority rule Majority voting Markov processes Mathematical monotonicity Mathematics Numerical analysis Numerical analysis. Scientific computation Numerical linear algebra Outcomes of education Pay-off Political economy Political reform Preferences Probability and statistics Probability theory and stochastic processes Public choice Reform Sciences and techniques of general use social choice Statistics Studies Voter behavior Voting Voting behaviour Voting paradox
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!