Income based price subsidies and parallel imports
We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | International review of economics & finance 2012-04, Vol.22 (1), p.25-41 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 41 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 25 |
| container_title | International review of economics & finance |
| container_volume | 22 |
| creator | Acharyya, Rajat García-Alonso, María D.C. |
| description | We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.iref.2011.08.001 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_913478506</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S1059056011000876</els_id><sourcerecordid>2552493721</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-588d12af3ce40ccf4f4aae07185f677be8486c9156d864eb26c77a44db5ce4833</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kMtKxDAUhoMoOI6-gKvivvWkuRbcyKDjwIAbXYc0OYWUTjsmreDbm2Fcu8oh_N-5fITcU6goUPnYVyFiV9VAaQW6AqAXZEW1YqUGJi9zDaIpQUi4Jjcp9QBQM96sCN2Nbjpg0dqEvjjG4LBIS5uCD5gKO-Y_G-0w4FCEw3GKc7olV50dEt79vWvy-frysXkr9-_b3eZ5XzrO-FwKrT2tbccccnCu4x23FkFRLTqpVIuaa-kaKqTXkmNbS6eU5dy3IhOasTV5OPc9xulrwTSbflrimEeahjKutACZQ_U55OKUUlZg8gkHG38MBXMyY3pzMmNOZgxok81k6OkMYV7_O2A0yQUcHfocdbPxU_gP_wVXCmt_</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>913478506</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Income based price subsidies and parallel imports</title><source>ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)</source><creator>Acharyya, Rajat ; García-Alonso, María D.C.</creator><creatorcontrib>Acharyya, Rajat ; García-Alonso, María D.C.</creatorcontrib><description>We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1059-0560</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-8036</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2011.08.001</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Greenwich: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Game theory ; Government subsidies ; Health care policy ; Imports ; Income based price subsidies ; Parallel imports ; Pharmaceuticals ; Studies ; Subsidies</subject><ispartof>International review of economics & finance, 2012-04, Vol.22 (1), p.25-41</ispartof><rights>2011 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Apr 2012</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-588d12af3ce40ccf4f4aae07185f677be8486c9156d864eb26c77a44db5ce4833</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-588d12af3ce40ccf4f4aae07185f677be8486c9156d864eb26c77a44db5ce4833</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056011000876$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,27901,27902,65306</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Acharyya, Rajat</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>García-Alonso, María D.C.</creatorcontrib><title>Income based price subsidies and parallel imports</title><title>International review of economics & finance</title><description>We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.</description><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Government subsidies</subject><subject>Health care policy</subject><subject>Imports</subject><subject>Income based price subsidies</subject><subject>Parallel imports</subject><subject>Pharmaceuticals</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><issn>1059-0560</issn><issn>1873-8036</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kMtKxDAUhoMoOI6-gKvivvWkuRbcyKDjwIAbXYc0OYWUTjsmreDbm2Fcu8oh_N-5fITcU6goUPnYVyFiV9VAaQW6AqAXZEW1YqUGJi9zDaIpQUi4Jjcp9QBQM96sCN2Nbjpg0dqEvjjG4LBIS5uCD5gKO-Y_G-0w4FCEw3GKc7olV50dEt79vWvy-frysXkr9-_b3eZ5XzrO-FwKrT2tbccccnCu4x23FkFRLTqpVIuaa-kaKqTXkmNbS6eU5dy3IhOasTV5OPc9xulrwTSbflrimEeahjKutACZQ_U55OKUUlZg8gkHG38MBXMyY3pzMmNOZgxok81k6OkMYV7_O2A0yQUcHfocdbPxU_gP_wVXCmt_</recordid><startdate>20120401</startdate><enddate>20120401</enddate><creator>Acharyya, Rajat</creator><creator>García-Alonso, María D.C.</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier Science Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120401</creationdate><title>Income based price subsidies and parallel imports</title><author>Acharyya, Rajat ; García-Alonso, María D.C.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-588d12af3ce40ccf4f4aae07185f677be8486c9156d864eb26c77a44db5ce4833</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Government subsidies</topic><topic>Health care policy</topic><topic>Imports</topic><topic>Income based price subsidies</topic><topic>Parallel imports</topic><topic>Pharmaceuticals</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Acharyya, Rajat</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>García-Alonso, María D.C.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>International review of economics & finance</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Acharyya, Rajat</au><au>García-Alonso, María D.C.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Income based price subsidies and parallel imports</atitle><jtitle>International review of economics & finance</jtitle><date>2012-04-01</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>22</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>25</spage><epage>41</epage><pages>25-41</pages><issn>1059-0560</issn><eissn>1873-8036</eissn><abstract>We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.</abstract><cop>Greenwich</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.iref.2011.08.001</doi><tpages>17</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1059-0560 |
| ispartof | International review of economics & finance, 2012-04, Vol.22 (1), p.25-41 |
| issn | 1059-0560 1873-8036 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_913478506 |
| source | ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Game theory Government subsidies Health care policy Imports Income based price subsidies Parallel imports Pharmaceuticals Studies Subsidies |
| title | Income based price subsidies and parallel imports |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-12T19%3A45%3A07IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Income%20based%20price%20subsidies%20and%20parallel%20imports&rft.jtitle=International%20review%20of%20economics%20&%20finance&rft.au=Acharyya,%20Rajat&rft.date=2012-04-01&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=25&rft.epage=41&rft.pages=25-41&rft.issn=1059-0560&rft.eissn=1873-8036&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.iref.2011.08.001&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2552493721%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=913478506&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S1059056011000876&rfr_iscdi=true |