United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East...

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Veröffentlicht in:Diplomacy and statecraft 2011-03, Vol.22 (1), p.61-80
1. Verfasser: Bischof, Günter
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description Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East-West relations were again groping towards détente and, the Czechoslovak Communist Party unleashed an ambitious reform agenda under Alexander Dubček. On 20 August, a massive military invasion by Warsaw Pact forces squashed the reform spirit. All three challenges to Soviet control on the periphery of its Cold War empire followed power struggles in the Kremlin and intimations of a slackening of the reigns of control in Moscow. Eastern Europe was terra incognita for most Americans, and the United States had never pursued an active policy in Eastern Europe. All three crisis scenarios were overshadowed by crises in other parts of the world-part of larger arcs of crises the superpowers were confronting simultaneously. The three crises also coincided, domestically, with intense presidential election politics. Washington ultimately respected the Yalta arrangements and tolerated the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Next to grudging respect for the Yalta outcomes, the ultimate spectre of mutual destruction in a nuclear war "compelled" the superpowers towards co-existence and, ultimately, in 1989, the satellite states had to liberate themselves.
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete
subjects 20th century
Armed conflict
Cold War
Communist parties
Crises
Czechoslovakia
Diplomacy
Eastern Europe
Foreign policy
German Democratic Republic
Germany (East)
Hungary
International relations
Military intervention
Political history
Presidential elections
Presidents
Rebellions
Reform
Soviet studies
Superpowers
U.S.A
U.S.S.R
United States of America
title United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
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