Cooperation in Games with Forgetfulness
Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall. This paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game-theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior. We fi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Management science 2011-02, Vol.57 (2), p.363-375 |
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| container_title | Management science |
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| creator | Thomadsen, Raphael Bhardwaj, Pradeep |
| description | Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall. This paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game-theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior. We find that forgetfulness impacts the ability of firms to cooperate in countervailing directions. On one hand, forgetfulness can diminish the ability to punish deviators, making cooperation more difficult. On the other hand, under some conditions forgetfulness can make meting out severe punishments-even below-(stage) minimax punishments-credible and decrease the ability for players to effectively deviate, facilitating cooperation even in circumstances where cooperation cannot be sustained under perfect recall. We apply our model to a number of strategic games that commonly appear in the literature.
This paper was accepted by Preyas Desai, marketing. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1271 |
| format | Article |
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Utility theory</subject><subject>Deviation</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Firm modelling</subject><subject>Franchise agreements</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>games-group decisions</subject><subject>Group dynamics</subject><subject>Information</subject><subject>information systems</subject><subject>IT policy and management</subject><subject>Knowledge management</subject><subject>Management science</subject><subject>Managers</subject><subject>marketing</subject><subject>Memory</subject><subject>Minimax</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Operational research and scientific management</subject><subject>Operational research. 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Utility theory</topic><topic>Deviation</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Firm modelling</topic><topic>Franchise agreements</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>games-group decisions</topic><topic>Group dynamics</topic><topic>Information</topic><topic>information systems</topic><topic>IT policy and management</topic><topic>Knowledge management</topic><topic>Management science</topic><topic>Managers</topic><topic>marketing</topic><topic>Memory</topic><topic>Minimax</topic><topic>Nash equilibrium</topic><topic>Operational research and scientific management</topic><topic>Operational research. Management science</topic><topic>Prisoners dilemma</topic><topic>Punishment</topic><topic>Strategic behaviour</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Theater</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Thomadsen, Raphael</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Bhardwaj, Pradeep</creatorcontrib><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale Business: Insights</collection><collection>Business Insights: Essentials</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Management science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Thomadsen, Raphael</au><au>Bhardwaj, Pradeep</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Cooperation in Games with Forgetfulness</atitle><jtitle>Management science</jtitle><date>2011-02-01</date><risdate>2011</risdate><volume>57</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>363</spage><epage>375</epage><pages>363-375</pages><issn>0025-1909</issn><eissn>1526-5501</eissn><coden>MSCIAM</coden><abstract>Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall. 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| ispartof | Management science, 2011-02, Vol.57 (2), p.363-375 |
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| subjects | Ability Applied sciences Automata Business structures competitive strategy Cooperation Decision making Decision theory. Utility theory Deviation Equilibrium Exact sciences and technology Firm modelling Franchise agreements Game theory games-group decisions Group dynamics Information information systems IT policy and management Knowledge management Management science Managers marketing Memory Minimax Nash equilibrium Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Prisoners dilemma Punishment Strategic behaviour Studies Theater |
| title | Cooperation in Games with Forgetfulness |
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