The Impact of Malicious Agents on the Enterprise Software Industry
In this paper, a competitive software market that includes horizontal and quality differentiation, as well as a negative network effect driven by the presence of malicious agents, is modeled. Software products with larger installed bases, and therefore more potential computers to attack, present mor...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | MIS quarterly 2010-09, Vol.34 (3), p.595-612 |
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| container_title | MIS quarterly |
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| creator | Galbreth, Michael R. Shor, Mikhael |
| description | In this paper, a competitive software market that includes horizontal and quality differentiation, as well as a negative network effect driven by the presence of malicious agents, is modeled. Software products with larger installed bases, and therefore more potential computers to attack, present more appealing targets for malicious agents. One finding is that software firms may profit from increased malicious activity. Software products in a more competitive market are less likely to invest in security, while monopolistic or niche products are likely to be more secure from malicious attack. The results provide insights for IS managers considering enterprise software adoption. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/25750693 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | MIS quarterly, 2010-09, Vol.34 (3), p.595-612 |
| issn | 0276-7783 2162-9730 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Computer software Computer viruses Consumer economics Consumer equilibrium Consumer prices Cybersecurity Economic competition Financial securities Impact analysis Market share Market shares Negative externalities Software Software industry Special Issue: Information Systems Security Studies Web browsers |
| title | The Impact of Malicious Agents on the Enterprise Software Industry |
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