Commonsense attribution

It is proposed that perceivers arrive at a causal quandary with naively generated hypotheses as to the cause for an event. It is suggested that such naive hypotheses (a) are tentatively advanced as explanations for the behavior, (b) may serve as an attribution of the crudest type, and (c) provide th...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of personality and social psychology 1980-12, Vol.39 (6), p.996-1009
1. Verfasser: Hansen, Ranald D
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container_title Journal of personality and social psychology
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creator Hansen, Ranald D
description It is proposed that perceivers arrive at a causal quandary with naively generated hypotheses as to the cause for an event. It is suggested that such naive hypotheses (a) are tentatively advanced as explanations for the behavior, (b) may serve as an attribution of the crudest type, and (c) provide the perceiver with a simplifying heuristic for acquiring and using further information. Information search and processing is described as following a principle of cognitive economy: The perceiver attempts to confirm the naively held hypothesis rather than disconfirm alternative hypotheses and uses information allowing for simple-covariation rather than complex augmentation and discounting schemes. Results of 5 experiments with a total of 305 undergraduates support this view. (27 ref)
doi_str_mv 10.1037/h0077723
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identifier ISSN: 0022-3514
ispartof Journal of personality and social psychology, 1980-12, Vol.39 (6), p.996-1009
issn 0022-3514
1939-1315
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_614296319
source EBSCOhost APA PsycARTICLES; Periodicals Index Online
subjects Attribution
Cognitive Processes
Human
Hypothesis Testing
title Commonsense attribution
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