Commonsense attribution
It is proposed that perceivers arrive at a causal quandary with naively generated hypotheses as to the cause for an event. It is suggested that such naive hypotheses (a) are tentatively advanced as explanations for the behavior, (b) may serve as an attribution of the crudest type, and (c) provide th...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of personality and social psychology 1980-12, Vol.39 (6), p.996-1009 |
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description | It is proposed that perceivers arrive at a causal quandary with naively generated hypotheses as to the cause for an event. It is suggested that such naive hypotheses (a) are tentatively advanced as explanations for the behavior, (b) may serve as an attribution of the crudest type, and (c) provide the perceiver with a simplifying heuristic for acquiring and using further information. Information search and processing is described as following a principle of cognitive economy: The perceiver attempts to confirm the naively held hypothesis rather than disconfirm alternative hypotheses and uses information allowing for simple-covariation rather than complex augmentation and discounting schemes. Results of 5 experiments with a total of 305 undergraduates support this view. (27 ref) |
doi_str_mv | 10.1037/h0077723 |
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subjects | Attribution Cognitive Processes Human Hypothesis Testing |
title | Commonsense attribution |
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