Persuasion Meets Delegation
A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single‐crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochas...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica 2025-01, Vol.93 (1), p.195-228 |
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| container_end_page | 228 |
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| container_title | Econometrica |
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| creator | Kolotilin, Anton Zapechelnyuk, Andriy |
| description | A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single‐crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3982/ECTA17051 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Econometrica, 2025-01, Vol.93 (1), p.195-228 |
| issn | 0012-9682 1468-0262 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete |
| subjects | Delegation discriminatory disclosure Marginal utility Persuasion |
| title | Persuasion Meets Delegation |
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