Ambiguous Contracts
We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity‐averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an ambiguous contract, and this gain can be arbitrarily high. We...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica 2024-11, Vol.92 (6), p.1967-1992 |
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| container_end_page | 1992 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 6 |
| container_start_page | 1967 |
| container_title | Econometrica |
| container_volume | 92 |
| creator | Dütting, Paul Feldman, Michal Peretz, Daniel Samuelson, Larry |
| description | We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity‐averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an ambiguous contract, and this gain can be arbitrarily high. We characterize the structure of optimal ambiguous contracts, showing that ambiguity drives optimal contracts toward simplicity. We also provide a characterization of ambiguity‐proof classes of contracts, where the principal cannot gain by infusing ambiguity. Finally, we show that when the agent can engage in mixed actions, the advantages of ambiguous contracts disappear. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3982/ECTA22687 |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0012-9682 |
| ispartof | Econometrica, 2024-11, Vol.92 (6), p.1967-1992 |
| issn | 0012-9682 1468-0262 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Access via Wiley Online Library |
| subjects | Ambiguity ambiguity aversion Ambiguous contract contract design Contracts hidden action moral hazard principal‐agent model Simplicity |
| title | Ambiguous Contracts |
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