Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests

Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests

This paper investigates the formation of teams in a contest. A manager sorts four workers—who differ in their productivity—into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; for example, a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible: Positive sor...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of industrial economics 2024-09, Vol.72 (3), p.1021-1051
Hauptverfasser: Fu, Qiang, Wu, Zenan, Zhang, Hanyao, Zhou, Yangfan
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Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Competition
Contests
Employee awards
Organizational behavior
Productivity
Resource allocation
Teams
Workers
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container_title The Journal of industrial economics
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creator Fu, Qiang
Wu, Zenan
Zhang, Hanyao
Zhou, Yangfan
description This paper investigates the formation of teams in a contest. A manager sorts four workers—who differ in their productivity—into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; for example, a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible: Positive sorting requires that each team consist of players of same caliber and negative sorting the opposite. We characterize the optimum. We further extend the model to allow the manager to set a prize schedule for the workers on each team upon a win, allocate productive resources between teams, and pick the level of competition of the contest.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/joie.12381
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subjects Competition
Contests
Employee awards
Organizational behavior
Productivity
Resource allocation
Teams
Workers
title Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests
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