Equivalence and Convention
The goal of this article is to analyze the role of convention in interpreting physical theories—in particular, how the distinction between the conventional and the nonconventional interacts with judgments of equivalence. We will begin with a discussion of what, if anything, distinguishes those state...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Philosophy of science 2024-12, Vol.91 (5), p.1242-1250 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 1250 |
---|---|
container_issue | 5 |
container_start_page | 1242 |
container_title | Philosophy of science |
container_volume | 91 |
creator | Dewar, Neil |
description | The goal of this article is to analyze the role of convention in interpreting physical theories—in particular, how the distinction between the conventional and the nonconventional interacts with judgments of equivalence. We will begin with a discussion of what, if anything, distinguishes those statements of a theory that might be dubbed “conventions.” This will lead us to consider the conventions that are not themselves part of a theory’s content but are rather applied to the theory in interpreting it. Finally, we will consider the idea that what conventions to adopt might, itself, be regarded as a matter of convention. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/psa.2023.148 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_3129916800</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>3129916800</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c188t-f2f9082749610b644f247ced78d4d6b0b3b4aaaf6a0af618b295761445041bc73</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotj01LxDAYhIMoWKs3T54WvNr6vkmaj6OUXRUWvCh4C0mbQJe17Sbtgv_eLutl5jLMzEPIPUKJgPJ5TLakQFmJXF2QDCumCynk9yXJABgWinJ1TW5S2gEgKlAZeVgf5u5o975v_Mr27aoe-qPvp27ob8lVsPvk7_49J1-b9Wf9Vmw_Xt_rl23RoFJTEWjQoKjkWiA4wXmgXDa-larlrXDgmOPW2iAsLILKUV1JgZxXwNE1kuXk8dw7xuEw-zSZ3TDHfpk0DKnWKNTyPidP51QTh5SiD2aM3Y-NvwbBnOjNQm9O9GahZ3_w1krc</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>3129916800</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Equivalence and Convention</title><source>Cambridge University Press Journals Complete</source><creator>Dewar, Neil</creator><creatorcontrib>Dewar, Neil</creatorcontrib><description>The goal of this article is to analyze the role of convention in interpreting physical theories—in particular, how the distinction between the conventional and the nonconventional interacts with judgments of equivalence. We will begin with a discussion of what, if anything, distinguishes those statements of a theory that might be dubbed “conventions.” This will lead us to consider the conventions that are not themselves part of a theory’s content but are rather applied to the theory in interpreting it. Finally, we will consider the idea that what conventions to adopt might, itself, be regarded as a matter of convention.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0031-8248</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1539-767X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.148</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press</publisher><subject>Conventions ; Electromagnetism ; Equivalence</subject><ispartof>Philosophy of science, 2024-12, Vol.91 (5), p.1242-1250</ispartof><rights>The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited. (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c188t-f2f9082749610b644f247ced78d4d6b0b3b4aaaf6a0af618b295761445041bc73</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-6623-4529</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27923,27924</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Dewar, Neil</creatorcontrib><title>Equivalence and Convention</title><title>Philosophy of science</title><description>The goal of this article is to analyze the role of convention in interpreting physical theories—in particular, how the distinction between the conventional and the nonconventional interacts with judgments of equivalence. We will begin with a discussion of what, if anything, distinguishes those statements of a theory that might be dubbed “conventions.” This will lead us to consider the conventions that are not themselves part of a theory’s content but are rather applied to the theory in interpreting it. Finally, we will consider the idea that what conventions to adopt might, itself, be regarded as a matter of convention.</description><subject>Conventions</subject><subject>Electromagnetism</subject><subject>Equivalence</subject><issn>0031-8248</issn><issn>1539-767X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNotj01LxDAYhIMoWKs3T54WvNr6vkmaj6OUXRUWvCh4C0mbQJe17Sbtgv_eLutl5jLMzEPIPUKJgPJ5TLakQFmJXF2QDCumCynk9yXJABgWinJ1TW5S2gEgKlAZeVgf5u5o975v_Mr27aoe-qPvp27ob8lVsPvk7_49J1-b9Wf9Vmw_Xt_rl23RoFJTEWjQoKjkWiA4wXmgXDa-larlrXDgmOPW2iAsLILKUV1JgZxXwNE1kuXk8dw7xuEw-zSZ3TDHfpk0DKnWKNTyPidP51QTh5SiD2aM3Y-NvwbBnOjNQm9O9GahZ3_w1krc</recordid><startdate>202412</startdate><enddate>202412</enddate><creator>Dewar, Neil</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6623-4529</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202412</creationdate><title>Equivalence and Convention</title><author>Dewar, Neil</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c188t-f2f9082749610b644f247ced78d4d6b0b3b4aaaf6a0af618b295761445041bc73</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Conventions</topic><topic>Electromagnetism</topic><topic>Equivalence</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Dewar, Neil</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Philosophy of science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Dewar, Neil</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Equivalence and Convention</atitle><jtitle>Philosophy of science</jtitle><date>2024-12</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>91</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1242</spage><epage>1250</epage><pages>1242-1250</pages><issn>0031-8248</issn><eissn>1539-767X</eissn><abstract>The goal of this article is to analyze the role of convention in interpreting physical theories—in particular, how the distinction between the conventional and the nonconventional interacts with judgments of equivalence. We will begin with a discussion of what, if anything, distinguishes those statements of a theory that might be dubbed “conventions.” This will lead us to consider the conventions that are not themselves part of a theory’s content but are rather applied to the theory in interpreting it. Finally, we will consider the idea that what conventions to adopt might, itself, be regarded as a matter of convention.</abstract><cop>Cambridge</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1017/psa.2023.148</doi><tpages>9</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6623-4529</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0031-8248 |
ispartof | Philosophy of science, 2024-12, Vol.91 (5), p.1242-1250 |
issn | 0031-8248 1539-767X |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_3129916800 |
source | Cambridge University Press Journals Complete |
subjects | Conventions Electromagnetism Equivalence |
title | Equivalence and Convention |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-10T10%3A29%3A12IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Equivalence%20and%20Convention&rft.jtitle=Philosophy%20of%20science&rft.au=Dewar,%20Neil&rft.date=2024-12&rft.volume=91&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=1242&rft.epage=1250&rft.pages=1242-1250&rft.issn=0031-8248&rft.eissn=1539-767X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/psa.2023.148&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E3129916800%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=3129916800&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |