Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Defined as a credible threat that strengthens the bargaining position of the executive, presidential vetoes, widely understudied, carry a stigma of confrontation between state powers. But under some institutional setups, partial vetoes can be an additional step in the executive–legislative bargainin...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Latin American politics and society 2024-08, Vol.66 (3), p.1-23
Hauptverfasser:	Belmar Soto, Jorge, Navia, Patricio, Osorio, Rodrigo
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bargaining Conflict Constitutional amendments Constitutions Cooperation Federalism Hypotheses Legislation Legislative process Legislatures Power Presidential vetoes Presidents Stigma Vetoes
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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