Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World
Abstract We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level dataset that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006–20, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corr...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Economic journal (London) 2024-05, Vol.134 (660), p.1494-1516 |
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| container_title | The Economic journal (London) |
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| creator | Fisman, Raymond Guriev, Sergei Ioramashvili, Carolin Plekhanov, Alexander |
| description | Abstract
We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level dataset that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006–20, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers, growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments—in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/ej/uead100 |
| format | Article |
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We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level dataset that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006–20, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers, growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments—in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0013-0133</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1468-0297</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead100</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Bribery ; Corruption ; Datenaufbereitung ; Geography ; Global ; Informal economy ; Korruption ; Payments ; Unternehmenswachstum ; Wirkung/Auswirkung ; Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ; Wirtschaftsunternehmen</subject><ispartof>The Economic journal (London), 2024-05, Vol.134 (660), p.1494-1516</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal Economic Society. 2024</rights><rights>The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal Economic Society.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c268t-be41f40f1a292743e1e5451cbd1864a6b9e316e6f2e261232b9259e15d4a5a3e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1583,27922,27923</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Fisman, Raymond</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Guriev, Sergei</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ioramashvili, Carolin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Plekhanov, Alexander</creatorcontrib><title>Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World</title><title>The Economic journal (London)</title><description>Abstract
We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level dataset that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006–20, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers, growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments—in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings.</description><subject>Bribery</subject><subject>Corruption</subject><subject>Datenaufbereitung</subject><subject>Geography</subject><subject>Global</subject><subject>Informal economy</subject><subject>Korruption</subject><subject>Payments</subject><subject>Unternehmenswachstum</subject><subject>Wirkung/Auswirkung</subject><subject>Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung</subject><subject>Wirtschaftsunternehmen</subject><issn>0013-0133</issn><issn>1468-0297</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp90EFLwzAUB_AgCs7pxU8QEC9CXV6SZsluMrYpDLwoHkvavrKWralJq_jtF-nAmw8e7_Lj_-BPyC2wR2BGzLCZDWhLYOyMTEAqnTBu5udkwhiIJK64JFchNCwOF3JCFkvn_dD1tWupbUu6rv2Bbrz77ncLuvqqS2wLpJV3B2q9G6Lod0g_nN-X1-SisvuAN6c7Je_r1dvyOdm-bl6WT9uk4Er3SY4SKskqsNzwuRQImMoUirwEraRVuUEBClXFkSvggueGpwYhLaVNrUAxJXdjbufd54Chzxo3-Da-zASAkEoYM4_qYVSFdyF4rLLO1wfrfzJg2W83GTbZqZuI6YixcG0d_qjWmgvDdBrJ_Ujc0P0XdQSKlWzR</recordid><startdate>20240501</startdate><enddate>20240501</enddate><creator>Fisman, Raymond</creator><creator>Guriev, Sergei</creator><creator>Ioramashvili, Carolin</creator><creator>Plekhanov, Alexander</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20240501</creationdate><title>Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World</title><author>Fisman, Raymond ; Guriev, Sergei ; Ioramashvili, Carolin ; Plekhanov, Alexander</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c268t-be41f40f1a292743e1e5451cbd1864a6b9e316e6f2e261232b9259e15d4a5a3e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Bribery</topic><topic>Corruption</topic><topic>Datenaufbereitung</topic><topic>Geography</topic><topic>Global</topic><topic>Informal economy</topic><topic>Korruption</topic><topic>Payments</topic><topic>Unternehmenswachstum</topic><topic>Wirkung/Auswirkung</topic><topic>Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung</topic><topic>Wirtschaftsunternehmen</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Fisman, Raymond</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Guriev, Sergei</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ioramashvili, Carolin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Plekhanov, Alexander</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Economic journal (London)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Fisman, Raymond</au><au>Guriev, Sergei</au><au>Ioramashvili, Carolin</au><au>Plekhanov, Alexander</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World</atitle><jtitle>The Economic journal (London)</jtitle><date>2024-05-01</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>134</volume><issue>660</issue><spage>1494</spage><epage>1516</epage><pages>1494-1516</pages><issn>0013-0133</issn><eissn>1468-0297</eissn><abstract>Abstract
We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level dataset that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006–20, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers, growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments—in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/ej/uead100</doi><tpages>23</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | The Economic journal (London), 2024-05, Vol.134 (660), p.1494-1516 |
| issn | 0013-0133 1468-0297 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Oxford Journals |
| subjects | Bribery Corruption Datenaufbereitung Geography Global Informal economy Korruption Payments Unternehmenswachstum Wirkung/Auswirkung Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Wirtschaftsunternehmen |
| title | Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World |
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