Auditor Tenure and Misreporting: Evidence from a Dynamic Oligopoly Game

We estimate an infinite-horizon dynamic oligopoly model of audit firm tenure and misstatements and evaluate a policy counterfactual involving mandatory audit firm rotation. Longer tenure lowers the cost of producing audits, increasing audit quality and reducing audit fees. Thus clients are less like...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Management science 2024-08, Vol.70 (8), p.5557-5585
1. Verfasser:	Cheynel, Edwige
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Audit quality Auditing Auditing standards auditor tenure Auditors Audits Companies conditional choice probability dynamic oligopoly Financial management Management science mandatory audit firm rotation misstatement Oligopoly Rotation Term limitations
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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