Direct implementation with evidence

We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben‐Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel clas...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Theoretical economics 2024-05, Vol.19 (2), p.783-822
Hauptverfasser:	Banerjee, Soumen, Chen, Yi‐Chun, Sun, Yifei
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	C72 Classification D02 D71 Design Economic theory Environmental protection Equilibrium Full implementation hard evidence Implementation Infrastructure mechanism design Negotiation Social choice
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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