If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism

For many presentist philosophers, e.g. Zimmerman (Contemp Debates Metaphys 10:211–225, 2008), a central motivation in favour of presentism is that it is supposed to be part of common sense. But the fact that common-sense intuitions are indeed presentist is usually taken for granted (and sometimes al...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Synthese (Dordrecht) 2024-05, Vol.203 (5), p.168, Article 168
1. Verfasser:	Guillon, Jean-Baptiste
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Debates Education Epistemology Free will Logic Metaphysics Original Research Phenomenology Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Science
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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