If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism

For many presentist philosophers, e.g. Zimmerman (Contemp Debates Metaphys 10:211–225, 2008), a central motivation in favour of presentism is that it is supposed to be part of common sense. But the fact that common-sense intuitions are indeed presentist is usually taken for granted (and sometimes also conceded by eternalists). As has been shown in other domains of philosophy (e.g. free will), we should be careful when attributing some supposed intuitions to common sense, and Torrengo (Phenomenology and Mind 12: 50–55, 2017) and Le Bihan (Igitur-Arguments Philos 9(1):1–23, 2018) have legitimately raised doubts about the assumption that common sense is presentist. In this paper, I take up this challenge and try to show that our common-sense intuitions do imply presentism. More precisely, the intuitions that I take to imply presentism are fundamental intuitions about our selves as conscious beings. The upshot is that presentism is so much embedded within our conception of our selves that if presentism is false, then I don’t exist!