Political vigilantism in Ghana: Motives, membership, and financing
This comprehensive study of political vigilantism in Ghana examines the motives, membership, and financing of the phenomenon and proffers solutions to combat it. We use a qualitative methodology of personal interviews with a broad section of Ghanaian political stakeholders totaling 50 participants....
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Politics & policy (Statesboro, Ga.) Ga.), 2024-04, Vol.52 (2), p.403-425 |
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| description | This comprehensive study of political vigilantism in Ghana examines the motives, membership, and financing of the phenomenon and proffers solutions to combat it. We use a qualitative methodology of personal interviews with a broad section of Ghanaian political stakeholders totaling 50 participants. This included 30 political vigilante members equally affiliated with the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress and selected from the vigilante hotbeds of the Northern, Upper East, and Ashanti regions of Ghana. The other political stakeholders total 20 and are made up of: five public political party executives, five civil society members, five police officers, and five local district assembly members. The motives include institutional weakness, winning political power, and economic and group solidarity. Membership involves family and friends, former security personnel, party members, and unemployed youth. Financing emanates from political parties, politicians, and the business class. We argue that patron–clientelism is the driving force behind political vigilantism and recommend more legal accountability for patrons, particularly through constitutional amendments guaranteeing a fixed term for the head of the police and separating the roles of Attorney General and Minister of Justice. This is to ensure that the former can impartially prosecute vigilante patrons. Punitive financial measures are also recommended to deter patrons, backed by sustained public education and more employment opportunities for the masses of unemployed youth—the bedrock of political vigilantism.
Related Articles
Akwei, Cynthia, Isaac S. Damoah, and Joseph Amankwah‐Amoah. 2020. “The Effects of Politics on the Implementation of Government Programs/Projects: Insights from a Developing Economy.” Politics & Policy 48(6): 1161–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12384.
Asiegbu, Martin F., Okey Marcellus Ikeanyibe, Pius Otu Abang, Okwudili Chukwuma Nwosu, and Chuka Eugene Ugwu. 2024. “Natural Resource Fund Governance and the Institutionalization of Rent Seeking in Nigeria's Oil Sector.” Politics & Policy 52(1): Early View. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12579.
Debrah, Emmanuel. 2016. “Decentralization, District Chief Executives, and District Assemblies in Ghana's Fourth Republic.” Politics & Policy 44 (1): 135–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12146.
加纳的政治私刑活动:动机、成员和融资
本文全面研究了加纳的政治私刑活动(political vigilantism)，分析了这一现象的动机、成员和融资，同时提出了打击该现象的解决方案。本研究采用定性方法，对一系列加纳政治利益攸关方进行了个人访谈(共50名参与者)。其中包 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/polp.12592 |
| format | Article |
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Related Articles
Akwei, Cynthia, Isaac S. Damoah, and Joseph Amankwah‐Amoah. 2020. “The Effects of Politics on the Implementation of Government Programs/Projects: Insights from a Developing Economy.” Politics & Policy 48(6): 1161–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12384.
Asiegbu, Martin F., Okey Marcellus Ikeanyibe, Pius Otu Abang, Okwudili Chukwuma Nwosu, and Chuka Eugene Ugwu. 2024. “Natural Resource Fund Governance and the Institutionalization of Rent Seeking in Nigeria's Oil Sector.” Politics & Policy 52(1): Early View. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12579.
Debrah, Emmanuel. 2016. “Decentralization, District Chief Executives, and District Assemblies in Ghana's Fourth Republic.” Politics & Policy 44 (1): 135–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12146.
加纳的政治私刑活动:动机、成员和融资
本文全面研究了加纳的政治私刑活动(political vigilantism)，分析了这一现象的动机、成员和融资，同时提出了打击该现象的解决方案。本研究采用定性方法，对一系列加纳政治利益攸关方进行了个人访谈(共50名参与者)。其中包括三十名政治自卫队成员，他们同样隶属于新爱国党(NPP)和全国民主大会(NDC)，并且是从加纳北部、上东部和阿散蒂地区的自卫队温床中选出的。其他政治利益攸关方共有二十名，由以下人员组成:五名公共政党高管、五名公民社会成员、五名警察和五名地方议会成员。动机包括:制度弱点、赢得政治权力、经济、群体团结。成员包括家人和朋友、前安全人员、党员和失业青年。融资来自政党、政客和商界人士。本研究认为，庇护者‐庇护主义是政治私刑背后的驱动力，并建议庇护者承担更多法律问责，特别是通过宪法修正案保证警察局长的固定任期，并将总检察长和司法部长的角色分开。这是为了确保前者能够公正地起诉私刑庇护者。还建议采取惩罚性财政措施来威慑庇护者，并以“持续的公共教育和为广大失业青年提供更多就业机会”为后盾，这些失业青年是政治私刑活动的基石。
Vigilancia política en Ghana: motivos, membresía y financiación
Este estudio integral del vigilantismo político en Ghana examina los motivos, la membresía y la financiación del fenómeno al tiempo que ofrece soluciones para combatirlo. El estudio se lleva a cabo mediante la metodología cualitativa de entrevistas personales con una amplia sección de actores políticos ghaneses, con un total de 50 participantes. Esto incluía a 30 miembros de vigilantes políticos igualmente afiliados al Nuevo Partido Patriótico (NPP) y al Congreso Nacional Demócrata (NDC) y seleccionados entre los focos de vigilantes de las regiones Norte, Alto Este y Ashanti de Ghana. Los demás actores políticos suman 20 y están integrados por: cinco directivos de partidos políticos públicos, cinco miembros de la sociedad civil, cinco policías y cinco asambleístas distritales locales. Los motivos incluyen la debilidad institucional, la obtención de poder político y la solidaridad económica y grupal. La membresía incluye a familiares y amigos, ex personal de seguridad, miembros del partido y jóvenes desempleados. El financiamiento emana de los partidos políticos, los políticos y la clase empresarial. La investigación sostiene que el clientelismo patrón es la fuerza impulsora detrás del vigilantismo político y recomienda una mayor responsabilidad legal para los patrones, particularmente a través de enmiendas constitucionales que garanticen un mandato fijo para el jefe de la policía y separe las funciones de Fiscal General y Ministro de Justicia. Esto es para garantizar que los primeros puedan procesar imparcialmente a los patrocinadores de los vigilantes. También se recomiendan medidas financieras punitivas para disuadir a los clientes, respaldadas por una educación pública sostenida y más oportunidades de empleo para las masas de jóvenes desempleados que son la base del vigilantismo político.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1555-5623</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1747-1346</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/polp.12592</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Malden: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</publisher><subject>Accountability ; Africa ; Amendments ; Attorneys general ; Chief executives ; Civil society ; Clientelism ; clientelismo clientelista ; consolidación democrática ; Constitutional amendments ; Decentralization ; democratic consolidation ; electoral violence ; Employment ; Employment opportunities ; Financing ; Ghana ; Ghanaian politics ; Governance ; Institutionalization ; Job opportunities ; Membership ; motives ; Nationalist movements ; Natural resources ; Patrons ; patron–clientelism ; Police ; Political parties ; Political power ; political vigilantism ; Politics ; política ghanesa ; política juvenil ; Program implementation ; Public finance ; Regions ; Rent-seeking ; Security personnel ; Stakeholders ; Strength ; Unemployed people ; Vigilantes ; Vigilantism ; vigilantismo político ; violencia electoral ; Youth employment ; youth politics ; África ; 加纳 ; 加纳政治 ; 庇护者‐庇护主义 ; 政治私刑 ; 民主巩固 ; 选举暴力 ; 青年政治 ; 非洲</subject><ispartof>Politics & policy (Statesboro, Ga.), 2024-04, Vol.52 (2), p.403-425</ispartof><rights>2024 Policy Studies Organization.</rights><rights>2024 Policy Studies Organization</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3012-fa202733b801fd6c509839cb166ac0e78f170a310a99343dfadb1aaf80fd44223</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3012-fa202733b801fd6c509839cb166ac0e78f170a310a99343dfadb1aaf80fd44223</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-1862-7736 ; 0009-0005-0152-0950</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fpolp.12592$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fpolp.12592$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,1411,27843,27901,27902,45550,45551</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Antwi‐Boateng, Osman</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Braimah, Mohammed Kamarideen</creatorcontrib><title>Political vigilantism in Ghana: Motives, membership, and financing</title><title>Politics & policy (Statesboro, Ga.)</title><description>This comprehensive study of political vigilantism in Ghana examines the motives, membership, and financing of the phenomenon and proffers solutions to combat it. We use a qualitative methodology of personal interviews with a broad section of Ghanaian political stakeholders totaling 50 participants. This included 30 political vigilante members equally affiliated with the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress and selected from the vigilante hotbeds of the Northern, Upper East, and Ashanti regions of Ghana. The other political stakeholders total 20 and are made up of: five public political party executives, five civil society members, five police officers, and five local district assembly members. The motives include institutional weakness, winning political power, and economic and group solidarity. Membership involves family and friends, former security personnel, party members, and unemployed youth. Financing emanates from political parties, politicians, and the business class. We argue that patron–clientelism is the driving force behind political vigilantism and recommend more legal accountability for patrons, particularly through constitutional amendments guaranteeing a fixed term for the head of the police and separating the roles of Attorney General and Minister of Justice. This is to ensure that the former can impartially prosecute vigilante patrons. Punitive financial measures are also recommended to deter patrons, backed by sustained public education and more employment opportunities for the masses of unemployed youth—the bedrock of political vigilantism.
Related Articles
Akwei, Cynthia, Isaac S. Damoah, and Joseph Amankwah‐Amoah. 2020. “The Effects of Politics on the Implementation of Government Programs/Projects: Insights from a Developing Economy.” Politics & Policy 48(6): 1161–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12384.
Asiegbu, Martin F., Okey Marcellus Ikeanyibe, Pius Otu Abang, Okwudili Chukwuma Nwosu, and Chuka Eugene Ugwu. 2024. “Natural Resource Fund Governance and the Institutionalization of Rent Seeking in Nigeria's Oil Sector.” Politics & Policy 52(1): Early View. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12579.
Debrah, Emmanuel. 2016. “Decentralization, District Chief Executives, and District Assemblies in Ghana's Fourth Republic.” Politics & Policy 44 (1): 135–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12146.
加纳的政治私刑活动:动机、成员和融资
本文全面研究了加纳的政治私刑活动(political vigilantism)，分析了这一现象的动机、成员和融资，同时提出了打击该现象的解决方案。本研究采用定性方法，对一系列加纳政治利益攸关方进行了个人访谈(共50名参与者)。其中包括三十名政治自卫队成员，他们同样隶属于新爱国党(NPP)和全国民主大会(NDC)，并且是从加纳北部、上东部和阿散蒂地区的自卫队温床中选出的。其他政治利益攸关方共有二十名，由以下人员组成:五名公共政党高管、五名公民社会成员、五名警察和五名地方议会成员。动机包括:制度弱点、赢得政治权力、经济、群体团结。成员包括家人和朋友、前安全人员、党员和失业青年。融资来自政党、政客和商界人士。本研究认为，庇护者‐庇护主义是政治私刑背后的驱动力，并建议庇护者承担更多法律问责，特别是通过宪法修正案保证警察局长的固定任期，并将总检察长和司法部长的角色分开。这是为了确保前者能够公正地起诉私刑庇护者。还建议采取惩罚性财政措施来威慑庇护者，并以“持续的公共教育和为广大失业青年提供更多就业机会”为后盾，这些失业青年是政治私刑活动的基石。
Vigilancia política en Ghana: motivos, membresía y financiación
Este estudio integral del vigilantismo político en Ghana examina los motivos, la membresía y la financiación del fenómeno al tiempo que ofrece soluciones para combatirlo. El estudio se lleva a cabo mediante la metodología cualitativa de entrevistas personales con una amplia sección de actores políticos ghaneses, con un total de 50 participantes. Esto incluía a 30 miembros de vigilantes políticos igualmente afiliados al Nuevo Partido Patriótico (NPP) y al Congreso Nacional Demócrata (NDC) y seleccionados entre los focos de vigilantes de las regiones Norte, Alto Este y Ashanti de Ghana. Los demás actores políticos suman 20 y están integrados por: cinco directivos de partidos políticos públicos, cinco miembros de la sociedad civil, cinco policías y cinco asambleístas distritales locales. Los motivos incluyen la debilidad institucional, la obtención de poder político y la solidaridad económica y grupal. La membresía incluye a familiares y amigos, ex personal de seguridad, miembros del partido y jóvenes desempleados. El financiamiento emana de los partidos políticos, los políticos y la clase empresarial. La investigación sostiene que el clientelismo patrón es la fuerza impulsora detrás del vigilantismo político y recomienda una mayor responsabilidad legal para los patrones, particularmente a través de enmiendas constitucionales que garanticen un mandato fijo para el jefe de la policía y separe las funciones de Fiscal General y Ministro de Justicia. Esto es para garantizar que los primeros puedan procesar imparcialmente a los patrocinadores de los vigilantes. También se recomiendan medidas financieras punitivas para disuadir a los clientes, respaldadas por una educación pública sostenida y más oportunidades de empleo para las masas de jóvenes desempleados que son la base del vigilantismo político.</description><subject>Accountability</subject><subject>Africa</subject><subject>Amendments</subject><subject>Attorneys general</subject><subject>Chief executives</subject><subject>Civil society</subject><subject>Clientelism</subject><subject>clientelismo clientelista</subject><subject>consolidación democrática</subject><subject>Constitutional amendments</subject><subject>Decentralization</subject><subject>democratic consolidation</subject><subject>electoral violence</subject><subject>Employment</subject><subject>Employment opportunities</subject><subject>Financing</subject><subject>Ghana</subject><subject>Ghanaian politics</subject><subject>Governance</subject><subject>Institutionalization</subject><subject>Job opportunities</subject><subject>Membership</subject><subject>motives</subject><subject>Nationalist movements</subject><subject>Natural resources</subject><subject>Patrons</subject><subject>patron–clientelism</subject><subject>Police</subject><subject>Political parties</subject><subject>Political power</subject><subject>political vigilantism</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>política ghanesa</subject><subject>política juvenil</subject><subject>Program implementation</subject><subject>Public finance</subject><subject>Regions</subject><subject>Rent-seeking</subject><subject>Security personnel</subject><subject>Stakeholders</subject><subject>Strength</subject><subject>Unemployed people</subject><subject>Vigilantes</subject><subject>Vigilantism</subject><subject>vigilantismo político</subject><subject>violencia electoral</subject><subject>Youth employment</subject><subject>youth politics</subject><subject>África</subject><subject>加纳</subject><subject>加纳政治</subject><subject>庇护者‐庇护主义</subject><subject>政治私刑</subject><subject>民主巩固</subject><subject>选举暴力</subject><subject>青年政治</subject><subject>非洲</subject><issn>1555-5623</issn><issn>1747-1346</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1PwkAQhjdGExG9-AuaeDMUZ7_64U2JogkGDnreTNtdWNJua7dA-PcW69m5zByeed_kIeSWwpT289DUZTOlTKbsjIxoLOKQchGd97eUMpQR45fkyvstgBAC5Ig8r-rSdjbHMtjbtS3RddZXgXXBfIMOH4OPurN77SdBpatMt35jm0mArgiMdehy69bX5MJg6fXN3x6Tr9eXz9lbuFjO32dPizDnQFlokAGLOc8SoKaIcglpwtM8o1GEOeg4MTQG5BQwTbnghcEio4gmAVMIwRgfk7sht2nr7532ndrWu9b1lYoDTyHhcSx76n6g8rb2vtVGNa2tsD0qCurkSJ0cqV9HPUwH-GBLffyHVKvlYjX8_AC-fGhb</recordid><startdate>202404</startdate><enddate>202404</enddate><creator>Antwi‐Boateng, Osman</creator><creator>Braimah, Mohammed Kamarideen</creator><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1862-7736</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0005-0152-0950</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202404</creationdate><title>Political vigilantism in Ghana: Motives, membership, and financing</title><author>Antwi‐Boateng, Osman ; Braimah, Mohammed Kamarideen</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3012-fa202733b801fd6c509839cb166ac0e78f170a310a99343dfadb1aaf80fd44223</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Accountability</topic><topic>Africa</topic><topic>Amendments</topic><topic>Attorneys general</topic><topic>Chief executives</topic><topic>Civil society</topic><topic>Clientelism</topic><topic>clientelismo clientelista</topic><topic>consolidación democrática</topic><topic>Constitutional amendments</topic><topic>Decentralization</topic><topic>democratic consolidation</topic><topic>electoral violence</topic><topic>Employment</topic><topic>Employment opportunities</topic><topic>Financing</topic><topic>Ghana</topic><topic>Ghanaian politics</topic><topic>Governance</topic><topic>Institutionalization</topic><topic>Job opportunities</topic><topic>Membership</topic><topic>motives</topic><topic>Nationalist movements</topic><topic>Natural resources</topic><topic>Patrons</topic><topic>patron–clientelism</topic><topic>Police</topic><topic>Political parties</topic><topic>Political power</topic><topic>political vigilantism</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>política ghanesa</topic><topic>política juvenil</topic><topic>Program implementation</topic><topic>Public finance</topic><topic>Regions</topic><topic>Rent-seeking</topic><topic>Security personnel</topic><topic>Stakeholders</topic><topic>Strength</topic><topic>Unemployed people</topic><topic>Vigilantes</topic><topic>Vigilantism</topic><topic>vigilantismo político</topic><topic>violencia electoral</topic><topic>Youth employment</topic><topic>youth politics</topic><topic>África</topic><topic>加纳</topic><topic>加纳政治</topic><topic>庇护者‐庇护主义</topic><topic>政治私刑</topic><topic>民主巩固</topic><topic>选举暴力</topic><topic>青年政治</topic><topic>非洲</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Antwi‐Boateng, Osman</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Braimah, Mohammed Kamarideen</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Politics & policy (Statesboro, Ga.)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Antwi‐Boateng, Osman</au><au>Braimah, Mohammed Kamarideen</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Political vigilantism in Ghana: Motives, membership, and financing</atitle><jtitle>Politics & policy (Statesboro, Ga.)</jtitle><date>2024-04</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>52</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>403</spage><epage>425</epage><pages>403-425</pages><issn>1555-5623</issn><eissn>1747-1346</eissn><abstract>This comprehensive study of political vigilantism in Ghana examines the motives, membership, and financing of the phenomenon and proffers solutions to combat it. We use a qualitative methodology of personal interviews with a broad section of Ghanaian political stakeholders totaling 50 participants. This included 30 political vigilante members equally affiliated with the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress and selected from the vigilante hotbeds of the Northern, Upper East, and Ashanti regions of Ghana. The other political stakeholders total 20 and are made up of: five public political party executives, five civil society members, five police officers, and five local district assembly members. The motives include institutional weakness, winning political power, and economic and group solidarity. Membership involves family and friends, former security personnel, party members, and unemployed youth. Financing emanates from political parties, politicians, and the business class. We argue that patron–clientelism is the driving force behind political vigilantism and recommend more legal accountability for patrons, particularly through constitutional amendments guaranteeing a fixed term for the head of the police and separating the roles of Attorney General and Minister of Justice. This is to ensure that the former can impartially prosecute vigilante patrons. Punitive financial measures are also recommended to deter patrons, backed by sustained public education and more employment opportunities for the masses of unemployed youth—the bedrock of political vigilantism.
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Akwei, Cynthia, Isaac S. Damoah, and Joseph Amankwah‐Amoah. 2020. “The Effects of Politics on the Implementation of Government Programs/Projects: Insights from a Developing Economy.” Politics & Policy 48(6): 1161–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12384.
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加纳的政治私刑活动:动机、成员和融资
本文全面研究了加纳的政治私刑活动(political vigilantism)，分析了这一现象的动机、成员和融资，同时提出了打击该现象的解决方案。本研究采用定性方法，对一系列加纳政治利益攸关方进行了个人访谈(共50名参与者)。其中包括三十名政治自卫队成员，他们同样隶属于新爱国党(NPP)和全国民主大会(NDC)，并且是从加纳北部、上东部和阿散蒂地区的自卫队温床中选出的。其他政治利益攸关方共有二十名，由以下人员组成:五名公共政党高管、五名公民社会成员、五名警察和五名地方议会成员。动机包括:制度弱点、赢得政治权力、经济、群体团结。成员包括家人和朋友、前安全人员、党员和失业青年。融资来自政党、政客和商界人士。本研究认为，庇护者‐庇护主义是政治私刑背后的驱动力，并建议庇护者承担更多法律问责，特别是通过宪法修正案保证警察局长的固定任期，并将总检察长和司法部长的角色分开。这是为了确保前者能够公正地起诉私刑庇护者。还建议采取惩罚性财政措施来威慑庇护者，并以“持续的公共教育和为广大失业青年提供更多就业机会”为后盾，这些失业青年是政治私刑活动的基石。
Vigilancia política en Ghana: motivos, membresía y financiación
Este estudio integral del vigilantismo político en Ghana examina los motivos, la membresía y la financiación del fenómeno al tiempo que ofrece soluciones para combatirlo. El estudio se lleva a cabo mediante la metodología cualitativa de entrevistas personales con una amplia sección de actores políticos ghaneses, con un total de 50 participantes. Esto incluía a 30 miembros de vigilantes políticos igualmente afiliados al Nuevo Partido Patriótico (NPP) y al Congreso Nacional Demócrata (NDC) y seleccionados entre los focos de vigilantes de las regiones Norte, Alto Este y Ashanti de Ghana. Los demás actores políticos suman 20 y están integrados por: cinco directivos de partidos políticos públicos, cinco miembros de la sociedad civil, cinco policías y cinco asambleístas distritales locales. Los motivos incluyen la debilidad institucional, la obtención de poder político y la solidaridad económica y grupal. La membresía incluye a familiares y amigos, ex personal de seguridad, miembros del partido y jóvenes desempleados. El financiamiento emana de los partidos políticos, los políticos y la clase empresarial. La investigación sostiene que el clientelismo patrón es la fuerza impulsora detrás del vigilantismo político y recomienda una mayor responsabilidad legal para los patrones, particularmente a través de enmiendas constitucionales que garanticen un mandato fijo para el jefe de la policía y separe las funciones de Fiscal General y Ministro de Justicia. Esto es para garantizar que los primeros puedan procesar imparcialmente a los patrocinadores de los vigilantes. También se recomiendan medidas financieras punitivas para disuadir a los clientes, respaldadas por una educación pública sostenida y más oportunidades de empleo para las masas de jóvenes desempleados que son la base del vigilantismo político.</abstract><cop>Malden</cop><pub>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/polp.12592</doi><tpages>23</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1862-7736</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0005-0152-0950</orcidid></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1555-5623 |
| ispartof | Politics & policy (Statesboro, Ga.), 2024-04, Vol.52 (2), p.403-425 |
| issn | 1555-5623 1747-1346 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_3039083775 |
| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; PAIS Index |
| subjects | Accountability Africa Amendments Attorneys general Chief executives Civil society Clientelism clientelismo clientelista consolidación democrática Constitutional amendments Decentralization democratic consolidation electoral violence Employment Employment opportunities Financing Ghana Ghanaian politics Governance Institutionalization Job opportunities Membership motives Nationalist movements Natural resources Patrons patron–clientelism Police Political parties Political power political vigilantism Politics política ghanesa política juvenil Program implementation Public finance Regions Rent-seeking Security personnel Stakeholders Strength Unemployed people Vigilantes Vigilantism vigilantismo político violencia electoral Youth employment youth politics África 加纳 加纳政治 庇护者‐庇护主义 政治私刑 民主巩固 选举暴力 青年政治 非洲 |
| title | Political vigilantism in Ghana: Motives, membership, and financing |
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