Global climate policy with differentiated carbon price floors

We use a state-of-the-art global general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of an International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF) proposal for the coordination of global climate policy. With the ICPF proposal, countries would implement a carbon price floor that is differentiated according to their le...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Climate policy 2024-04, Vol.24 (4), p.515-528
Hauptverfasser: Chateau, Jean, Jaumotte, Florence, Schwerhoff, Gregor
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 528
container_issue 4
container_start_page 515
container_title Climate policy
container_volume 24
creator Chateau, Jean
Jaumotte, Florence
Schwerhoff, Gregor
description We use a state-of-the-art global general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of an International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF) proposal for the coordination of global climate policy. With the ICPF proposal, countries would implement a carbon price floor that is differentiated according to their level of development. The price floor could be implemented by an actual carbon price or other policies with equivalent stringency. Implementing such a joint effort would be a big step towards aligning global emissions with the Paris Agreement. The study highlights three main findings. First, the ICPF is progressive in terms of emission reductions and demands considerably more effort from high-income countries (HICs). Unlike proposals based on equity principles, however, it requires neither extremely high emission reductions from HICs nor massive financial transfers. Second, the differentiated carbon prices cost only an additional 0.3 percent of global GDP compared to a global uniform carbon price. Third, the ICPF can be as effective as border carbon adjustment (BCA) mechanisms at preserving competitiveness of HICs despite the differentiation in carbon price floors. This means, there would be no need for BCA with an ICPF. Compared to a BCA, HICs can avoid the administrative burden and low-income countries (LICs) will not face the cost of BCA. As a first step to global climate policy, a sectoral ICPF for the EITE sector could be introduced. It would address competitiveness concerns almost as well as the full ICPF. An International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF), with carbon price floors differentiated by development level, would incur only small economic costs compared to baseline economic growth. The ICPF would allow for international burden sharing, with HICs incurring higher cost than middle - and low-income countries. The ICPF reduces distortions to competitiveness as much as BCA, so that no BCA would be necessary. A 'sectoral ICPF' in energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors would be effective against leakage and loss in competitiveness and would thus be an attractive alternative to border carbon adjustment.
doi_str_mv 10.1080/14693062.2023.2205376
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_infor</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_3031494067</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>3031494067</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c461t-9d573e6fcc30fae4b8e905d8917a263d9751bccc31f3d757a6d2d249f4f3a2b73</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE1LAzEQhhdRsH78BGHBi5etk-_NQVBEqyB40XPI5gNT0k1NtpT-e3epInjwNAPzvO_MvFV1gWCOoIVrRLkkwPEcAyZzjIERwQ-qGRIMN4IycTj2I9NM0HF1UsoSAHFJyay6WcTU6VibGFZ6cPU6xWB29TYMH7UN3rvs-iGME1sbnbvU1-scjKt9TCmXs-rI61jc-Xc9rd4fH97un5qX18Xz_d1LYyhHQyMtE8RxbwwBrx3tWieB2VYioTEnVgqGOjNOkSdWMKG5xRZT6aknGneCnFZXe991Tp8bVwa1CsW4GHXv0qYoghhpERBoR_TyD7pMm9yP1ykCBFFJgU-GbE-ZnErJzqvxrZXOO4VATaGqn1DVFKr6DnXU1XudM6kP5VfVSgycYZisb_dI6H3KK71NOVo16F1M2WfdmzDd---WL5t1h0E</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>3031494067</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Global climate policy with differentiated carbon price floors</title><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Taylor &amp; Francis:Master (3349 titles)</source><creator>Chateau, Jean ; Jaumotte, Florence ; Schwerhoff, Gregor</creator><creatorcontrib>Chateau, Jean ; Jaumotte, Florence ; Schwerhoff, Gregor</creatorcontrib><description>We use a state-of-the-art global general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of an International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF) proposal for the coordination of global climate policy. With the ICPF proposal, countries would implement a carbon price floor that is differentiated according to their level of development. The price floor could be implemented by an actual carbon price or other policies with equivalent stringency. Implementing such a joint effort would be a big step towards aligning global emissions with the Paris Agreement. The study highlights three main findings. First, the ICPF is progressive in terms of emission reductions and demands considerably more effort from high-income countries (HICs). Unlike proposals based on equity principles, however, it requires neither extremely high emission reductions from HICs nor massive financial transfers. Second, the differentiated carbon prices cost only an additional 0.3 percent of global GDP compared to a global uniform carbon price. Third, the ICPF can be as effective as border carbon adjustment (BCA) mechanisms at preserving competitiveness of HICs despite the differentiation in carbon price floors. This means, there would be no need for BCA with an ICPF. Compared to a BCA, HICs can avoid the administrative burden and low-income countries (LICs) will not face the cost of BCA. As a first step to global climate policy, a sectoral ICPF for the EITE sector could be introduced. It would address competitiveness concerns almost as well as the full ICPF. An International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF), with carbon price floors differentiated by development level, would incur only small economic costs compared to baseline economic growth. The ICPF would allow for international burden sharing, with HICs incurring higher cost than middle - and low-income countries. The ICPF reduces distortions to competitiveness as much as BCA, so that no BCA would be necessary. A 'sectoral ICPF' in energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors would be effective against leakage and loss in competitiveness and would thus be an attractive alternative to border carbon adjustment.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1469-3062</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1752-7457</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1752-7457</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2023.2205376</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London: Taylor &amp; Francis</publisher><subject>border carbon adjustment ; Carbon ; carbon markets ; Climate ; Climate policy ; Competition ; Competitiveness ; Computable General Equilibrium model ; Coordination ; Differentiation ; Emissions ; Emissions control ; environmental policy ; Equilibrium ; Global climate ; international coordination ; Low income areas ; Paris Agreement ; Policies ; Prices ; Pricing policies ; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</subject><ispartof>Climate policy, 2024-04, Vol.24 (4), p.515-528</ispartof><rights>2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor &amp; Francis Group 2023</rights><rights>2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor &amp; Francis Group</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c461t-9d573e6fcc30fae4b8e905d8917a263d9751bccc31f3d757a6d2d249f4f3a2b73</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c461t-9d573e6fcc30fae4b8e905d8917a263d9751bccc31f3d757a6d2d249f4f3a2b73</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-3644-3447</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14693062.2023.2205376$$EPDF$$P50$$Ginformaworld$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2023.2205376$$EHTML$$P50$$Ginformaworld$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,778,782,27853,27911,27912,59632,60421</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Chateau, Jean</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jaumotte, Florence</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schwerhoff, Gregor</creatorcontrib><title>Global climate policy with differentiated carbon price floors</title><title>Climate policy</title><description>We use a state-of-the-art global general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of an International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF) proposal for the coordination of global climate policy. With the ICPF proposal, countries would implement a carbon price floor that is differentiated according to their level of development. The price floor could be implemented by an actual carbon price or other policies with equivalent stringency. Implementing such a joint effort would be a big step towards aligning global emissions with the Paris Agreement. The study highlights three main findings. First, the ICPF is progressive in terms of emission reductions and demands considerably more effort from high-income countries (HICs). Unlike proposals based on equity principles, however, it requires neither extremely high emission reductions from HICs nor massive financial transfers. Second, the differentiated carbon prices cost only an additional 0.3 percent of global GDP compared to a global uniform carbon price. Third, the ICPF can be as effective as border carbon adjustment (BCA) mechanisms at preserving competitiveness of HICs despite the differentiation in carbon price floors. This means, there would be no need for BCA with an ICPF. Compared to a BCA, HICs can avoid the administrative burden and low-income countries (LICs) will not face the cost of BCA. As a first step to global climate policy, a sectoral ICPF for the EITE sector could be introduced. It would address competitiveness concerns almost as well as the full ICPF. An International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF), with carbon price floors differentiated by development level, would incur only small economic costs compared to baseline economic growth. The ICPF would allow for international burden sharing, with HICs incurring higher cost than middle - and low-income countries. The ICPF reduces distortions to competitiveness as much as BCA, so that no BCA would be necessary. A 'sectoral ICPF' in energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors would be effective against leakage and loss in competitiveness and would thus be an attractive alternative to border carbon adjustment.</description><subject>border carbon adjustment</subject><subject>Carbon</subject><subject>carbon markets</subject><subject>Climate</subject><subject>Climate policy</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Competitiveness</subject><subject>Computable General Equilibrium model</subject><subject>Coordination</subject><subject>Differentiation</subject><subject>Emissions</subject><subject>Emissions control</subject><subject>environmental policy</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Global climate</subject><subject>international coordination</subject><subject>Low income areas</subject><subject>Paris Agreement</subject><subject>Policies</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Pricing policies</subject><subject>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</subject><issn>1469-3062</issn><issn>1752-7457</issn><issn>1752-7457</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1LAzEQhhdRsH78BGHBi5etk-_NQVBEqyB40XPI5gNT0k1NtpT-e3epInjwNAPzvO_MvFV1gWCOoIVrRLkkwPEcAyZzjIERwQ-qGRIMN4IycTj2I9NM0HF1UsoSAHFJyay6WcTU6VibGFZ6cPU6xWB29TYMH7UN3rvs-iGME1sbnbvU1-scjKt9TCmXs-rI61jc-Xc9rd4fH97un5qX18Xz_d1LYyhHQyMtE8RxbwwBrx3tWieB2VYioTEnVgqGOjNOkSdWMKG5xRZT6aknGneCnFZXe991Tp8bVwa1CsW4GHXv0qYoghhpERBoR_TyD7pMm9yP1ykCBFFJgU-GbE-ZnErJzqvxrZXOO4VATaGqn1DVFKr6DnXU1XudM6kP5VfVSgycYZisb_dI6H3KK71NOVo16F1M2WfdmzDd---WL5t1h0E</recordid><startdate>20240420</startdate><enddate>20240420</enddate><creator>Chateau, Jean</creator><creator>Jaumotte, Florence</creator><creator>Schwerhoff, Gregor</creator><general>Taylor &amp; Francis</general><general>Taylor &amp; Francis Ltd</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>4T-</scope><scope>7ST</scope><scope>7TA</scope><scope>7TG</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7U6</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>F1W</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>H97</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>JG9</scope><scope>KL.</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L.G</scope><scope>7S9</scope><scope>L.6</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3644-3447</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20240420</creationdate><title>Global climate policy with differentiated carbon price floors</title><author>Chateau, Jean ; Jaumotte, Florence ; Schwerhoff, Gregor</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c461t-9d573e6fcc30fae4b8e905d8917a263d9751bccc31f3d757a6d2d249f4f3a2b73</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>border carbon adjustment</topic><topic>Carbon</topic><topic>carbon markets</topic><topic>Climate</topic><topic>Climate policy</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Competitiveness</topic><topic>Computable General Equilibrium model</topic><topic>Coordination</topic><topic>Differentiation</topic><topic>Emissions</topic><topic>Emissions control</topic><topic>environmental policy</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Global climate</topic><topic>international coordination</topic><topic>Low income areas</topic><topic>Paris Agreement</topic><topic>Policies</topic><topic>Prices</topic><topic>Pricing policies</topic><topic>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Chateau, Jean</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jaumotte, Florence</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schwerhoff, Gregor</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Docstoc</collection><collection>Environment Abstracts</collection><collection>Materials Business File</collection><collection>Meteorological &amp; Geoastrophysical Abstracts</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Sustainability Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>ASFA: Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>Aquatic Science &amp; Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA) 3: Aquatic Pollution &amp; Environmental Quality</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><collection>Meteorological &amp; Geoastrophysical Abstracts - Academic</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Aquatic Science &amp; Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA) Professional</collection><collection>AGRICOLA</collection><collection>AGRICOLA - Academic</collection><jtitle>Climate policy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Chateau, Jean</au><au>Jaumotte, Florence</au><au>Schwerhoff, Gregor</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Global climate policy with differentiated carbon price floors</atitle><jtitle>Climate policy</jtitle><date>2024-04-20</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>24</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>515</spage><epage>528</epage><pages>515-528</pages><issn>1469-3062</issn><issn>1752-7457</issn><eissn>1752-7457</eissn><abstract>We use a state-of-the-art global general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of an International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF) proposal for the coordination of global climate policy. With the ICPF proposal, countries would implement a carbon price floor that is differentiated according to their level of development. The price floor could be implemented by an actual carbon price or other policies with equivalent stringency. Implementing such a joint effort would be a big step towards aligning global emissions with the Paris Agreement. The study highlights three main findings. First, the ICPF is progressive in terms of emission reductions and demands considerably more effort from high-income countries (HICs). Unlike proposals based on equity principles, however, it requires neither extremely high emission reductions from HICs nor massive financial transfers. Second, the differentiated carbon prices cost only an additional 0.3 percent of global GDP compared to a global uniform carbon price. Third, the ICPF can be as effective as border carbon adjustment (BCA) mechanisms at preserving competitiveness of HICs despite the differentiation in carbon price floors. This means, there would be no need for BCA with an ICPF. Compared to a BCA, HICs can avoid the administrative burden and low-income countries (LICs) will not face the cost of BCA. As a first step to global climate policy, a sectoral ICPF for the EITE sector could be introduced. It would address competitiveness concerns almost as well as the full ICPF. An International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF), with carbon price floors differentiated by development level, would incur only small economic costs compared to baseline economic growth. The ICPF would allow for international burden sharing, with HICs incurring higher cost than middle - and low-income countries. The ICPF reduces distortions to competitiveness as much as BCA, so that no BCA would be necessary. A 'sectoral ICPF' in energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors would be effective against leakage and loss in competitiveness and would thus be an attractive alternative to border carbon adjustment.</abstract><cop>London</cop><pub>Taylor &amp; Francis</pub><doi>10.1080/14693062.2023.2205376</doi><tpages>14</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3644-3447</orcidid></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1469-3062
ispartof Climate policy, 2024-04, Vol.24 (4), p.515-528
issn 1469-3062
1752-7457
1752-7457
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_3031494067
source PAIS Index; Taylor & Francis:Master (3349 titles)
subjects border carbon adjustment
Carbon
carbon markets
Climate
Climate policy
Competition
Competitiveness
Computable General Equilibrium model
Coordination
Differentiation
Emissions
Emissions control
environmental policy
Equilibrium
Global climate
international coordination
Low income areas
Paris Agreement
Policies
Prices
Pricing policies
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
title Global climate policy with differentiated carbon price floors
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-15T11%3A50%3A52IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_infor&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Global%20climate%20policy%20with%20differentiated%20carbon%20price%20floors&rft.jtitle=Climate%20policy&rft.au=Chateau,%20Jean&rft.date=2024-04-20&rft.volume=24&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=515&rft.epage=528&rft.pages=515-528&rft.issn=1469-3062&rft.eissn=1752-7457&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080/14693062.2023.2205376&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_infor%3E3031494067%3C/proquest_infor%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=3031494067&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true