A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspec...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | 4OR 2024-03, Vol.22 (1), p.17-30 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 30 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 17 |
| container_title | 4OR |
| container_volume | 22 |
| creator | Hou, Dongshuang Han, Weibin Xu, Genjiu Feng, Yifan |
| description | In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_3030967250</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>3030967250</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-5f8cb59791587bf4d3c702caf077cb2750c38e7367a754dfaa096c523114acfd3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kEtLAzEUhYMoWKt_wFXAdfTmNcmAm1J8FAou1HVI06ROaSc1mSnorzd2hO5c3QP3O-fAQeiawi0FUHeZAtOaAOMEQHJNxAka0YoKwgSlpwddEyEBztFFzmsAzrmAEbqf4JVvfbKb5tt2TWxxDLj78Hg6e8V7u-k9DjFhF-OuQF2z90XnDq_s1udLdBbsJvurvztG748Pb9NnMn95mk0nc-J4BR2RQbuFrFVNpVaLIJbcKWDOBlDKLZiS4Lj2ilfKKimWwVqoKycZp1RYF5Z8jG6G3F2Kn73PnVnHPrWl0nDgBVZMQqHYQLkUc04-mF1qtjZ9GQrmdyUzrGTKSuawkhHFhAeTd7Ft8tGidS2kUJIXhA9ILs925dOx_Z_gH_mScwg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>3030967250</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games</title><source>Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals</source><creator>Hou, Dongshuang ; Han, Weibin ; Xu, Genjiu ; Feng, Yifan</creator><creatorcontrib>Hou, Dongshuang ; Han, Weibin ; Xu, Genjiu ; Feng, Yifan</creatorcontrib><description>In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1619-4500</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1614-2411</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><subject>Business and Management ; Game theory ; Games ; Industrial and Production Engineering ; Operations research ; Operations Research/Decision Theory ; Optimization ; Players ; Research Paper</subject><ispartof>4OR, 2024-03, Vol.22 (1), p.17-30</ispartof><rights>The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2023. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-5f8cb59791587bf4d3c702caf077cb2750c38e7367a754dfaa096c523114acfd3</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-5028-2817</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27903,27904,41467,42536,51297</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hou, Dongshuang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Han, Weibin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xu, Genjiu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Feng, Yifan</creatorcontrib><title>A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games</title><title>4OR</title><addtitle>4OR-Q J Oper Res</addtitle><description>In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property.</description><subject>Business and Management</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Industrial and Production Engineering</subject><subject>Operations research</subject><subject>Operations Research/Decision Theory</subject><subject>Optimization</subject><subject>Players</subject><subject>Research Paper</subject><issn>1619-4500</issn><issn>1614-2411</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kEtLAzEUhYMoWKt_wFXAdfTmNcmAm1J8FAou1HVI06ROaSc1mSnorzd2hO5c3QP3O-fAQeiawi0FUHeZAtOaAOMEQHJNxAka0YoKwgSlpwddEyEBztFFzmsAzrmAEbqf4JVvfbKb5tt2TWxxDLj78Hg6e8V7u-k9DjFhF-OuQF2z90XnDq_s1udLdBbsJvurvztG748Pb9NnMn95mk0nc-J4BR2RQbuFrFVNpVaLIJbcKWDOBlDKLZiS4Lj2ilfKKimWwVqoKycZp1RYF5Z8jG6G3F2Kn73PnVnHPrWl0nDgBVZMQqHYQLkUc04-mF1qtjZ9GQrmdyUzrGTKSuawkhHFhAeTd7Ft8tGidS2kUJIXhA9ILs925dOx_Z_gH_mScwg</recordid><startdate>20240301</startdate><enddate>20240301</enddate><creator>Hou, Dongshuang</creator><creator>Han, Weibin</creator><creator>Xu, Genjiu</creator><creator>Feng, Yifan</creator><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5028-2817</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20240301</creationdate><title>A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games</title><author>Hou, Dongshuang ; Han, Weibin ; Xu, Genjiu ; Feng, Yifan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-5f8cb59791587bf4d3c702caf077cb2750c38e7367a754dfaa096c523114acfd3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Business and Management</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Games</topic><topic>Industrial and Production Engineering</topic><topic>Operations research</topic><topic>Operations Research/Decision Theory</topic><topic>Optimization</topic><topic>Players</topic><topic>Research Paper</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hou, Dongshuang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Han, Weibin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xu, Genjiu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Feng, Yifan</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><jtitle>4OR</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hou, Dongshuang</au><au>Han, Weibin</au><au>Xu, Genjiu</au><au>Feng, Yifan</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games</atitle><jtitle>4OR</jtitle><stitle>4OR-Q J Oper Res</stitle><date>2024-03-01</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>22</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>17</spage><epage>30</epage><pages>17-30</pages><issn>1619-4500</issn><eissn>1614-2411</eissn><abstract>In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property.</abstract><cop>Berlin/Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</pub><doi>10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4</doi><tpages>14</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5028-2817</orcidid></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1619-4500 |
| ispartof | 4OR, 2024-03, Vol.22 (1), p.17-30 |
| issn | 1619-4500 1614-2411 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_3030967250 |
| source | Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals |
| subjects | Business and Management Game theory Games Industrial and Production Engineering Operations research Operations Research/Decision Theory Optimization Players Research Paper |
| title | A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-26T22%3A32%3A27IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20generalization%20of%20the%20CIS%20value%20for%20cooperative%20cost%20games&rft.jtitle=4OR&rft.au=Hou,%20Dongshuang&rft.date=2024-03-01&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=17&rft.epage=30&rft.pages=17-30&rft.issn=1619-4500&rft.eissn=1614-2411&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E3030967250%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=3030967250&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |