Reasons as Reasons for Preferences

Reasons as Reasons for Preferences

I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform...

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Veröffentlicht in:American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) 2022-07, Vol.59 (3), p.297-311
1. Verfasser: Rowland, R.A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Attitudes
Desire
Philosophy
Preferences
Religious fundamentalism
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container_title American philosophical quarterly (Oxford)
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creator Rowland, R.A.
description I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for preferences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism.
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subjects Attitudes
Desire
Philosophy
Preferences
Religious fundamentalism
title Reasons as Reasons for Preferences
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