Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition

The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Accounting review 2024-03, Vol.99 (2), p.31-56
Hauptverfasser:	Bloomfield, Matthew J., Friedman, Henry L., Kim, Hwa Young
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Business ownership Compensation Competition Executive compensation Incentives Institutional investments Mergers Oligopoly Owners Ownership Revenue
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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