Disclosing a Random Walk

ABSTRACT We examine a dynamic disclosure model in which the value of a firm follows a random walk. Every period, with some probability, the manager learns the firm's value and decides whether to disclose it. The manager maximizes the market perception of the firm's value, which is based on...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of finance (New York) 2024-04, Vol.79 (2), p.1123-1146
Hauptverfasser:	KREMER, ILAN, SCHREIBER, AMNON, SKRZYPACZ, ANDRZEJ
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Business valuation Market value Neutrality Prices Random walk theory Risk reduction Thresholds Uncertainty Value
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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