Efficiency-Inducing Policy for Polluting Oligopolists

This paper characterizes an efficiency-inducing policy for a polluting oligopoly when pollution abatement is technologically feasible and when environmental damage depends on the pollution stock. Using a dynamic policy game between the regulator and the oligopolists, we show that a tax–subsidy schem...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Dynamic games and applications 2024-03, Vol.14 (1), p.195-222
Hauptverfasser:	Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, Rubio, Santiago J.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Communications Engineering Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Game Theory Management Science Market equilibrium Mathematics Mathematics and Statistics Networks Oligopoly Operations Research Pollution Pollution abatement Social and Behav. Sciences Subsidies Tax increases
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