A theory of managerial compensation and taxation with endogenous risk

We study the impact of endogenous shocks driven by collective actions of managers. We analyze how such endogenous shocks impact social welfare by employing an overlapping-generations model. We first prove that the competitive equilibrium allocation is suboptimal because of the externalities in manag...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory bulletin 2018-04, Vol.6 (1), p.81-100
Hauptverfasser:	Korpeoglu, C. Gizem, Spear, Stephen E.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Compensation Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Endogenous Equilibrium Executive compensation Externality Game Theory Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics Public Finance Research Article Risk Social and Behav. Sciences Social welfare Subsidies Taxation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!