How Easy is It to Fool Your Multimodal LLMs? An Empirical Analysis on Deceptive Prompts

The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we...

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Veröffentlicht in:arXiv.org 2024-07
Hauptverfasser: Qian, Yusu, Zhang, Haotian, Yang, Yinfei, Gan, Zhe
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we present MAD-Bench, a carefully curated benchmark that contains 1000 test samples divided into 5 categories, such as non-existent objects, count of objects, and spatial relationship. We provide a comprehensive analysis of popular MLLMs, ranging from GPT-4v, Reka, Gemini-Pro, to open-sourced models, such as LLaVA-NeXT and MiniCPM-Llama3. Empirically, we observe significant performance gaps between GPT-4o and other models; and previous robust instruction-tuned models are not effective on this new benchmark. While GPT-4o achieves 82.82% accuracy on MAD-Bench, the accuracy of any other model in our experiments ranges from 9% to 50%. We further propose a remedy that adds an additional paragraph to the deceptive prompts to encourage models to think twice before answering the question. Surprisingly, this simple method can even double the accuracy; however, the absolute numbers are still too low to be satisfactory. We hope MAD-Bench can serve as a valuable benchmark to stimulate further research to enhance model resilience against deceptive prompts.
ISSN:2331-8422