Revisiting the Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness Based on the Meaning of “I”

A widely shared view in the literature on first-person thought is that the ability to entertain first-person thoughts requires prior non-conceptual forms of self-consciousness. Many philosophers maintain that the distinctive awareness which accompanies the use of the first person already presupposes...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Review of philosophy and psychology 2023-12, Vol.14 (4), p.1505-1523
1. Verfasser:	Niemeck, Maik
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Cognitive Psychology Consciousness Developmental Psychology Education Epistemology Neurosciences Philosophy Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!