Asymmetric market power and wage suppression

We study a labor market in which two identical firms compete over a pool of homogeneous workers. Firms pre‐commit to their outreach to potential employees, either through their informative advertising choices, or through their screening processes, before engaging in a wage (Bertrand) competition. Al...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	The Scandinavian journal of economics 2024-01, Vol.126 (1), p.38-59
Hauptverfasser:	Blumkin, Tomer, Lagziel, David
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Advertising Asymmetric market power Asymmetry Companies Equilibrium Labor market Market shares oligopsony outreach tacit collusion
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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