Asymmetric market power and wage suppression
We study a labor market in which two identical firms compete over a pool of homogeneous workers. Firms pre‐commit to their outreach to potential employees, either through their informative advertising choices, or through their screening processes, before engaging in a wage (Bertrand) competition. Al...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Scandinavian journal of economics 2024-01, Vol.126 (1), p.38-59 |
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| container_title | The Scandinavian journal of economics |
| container_volume | 126 |
| creator | Blumkin, Tomer Lagziel, David |
| description | We study a labor market in which two identical firms compete over a pool of homogeneous workers. Firms pre‐commit to their outreach to potential employees, either through their informative advertising choices, or through their screening processes, before engaging in a wage (Bertrand) competition. Although firms are homogeneous, the unique pure‐strategy equilibrium is asymmetric: one firm maximizes its outreach whereas the other compromises on a significantly smaller market share. The features of the asymmetric equilibrium extend to a general oligopsony with any finite number of firms. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/sjoe.12545 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0347-0520 |
| ispartof | The Scandinavian journal of economics, 2024-01, Vol.126 (1), p.38-59 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library - AutoHoldings Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Advertising Asymmetric market power Asymmetry Companies Equilibrium Labor market Market shares oligopsony outreach tacit collusion |
| title | Asymmetric market power and wage suppression |
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