62 Moral Reasoning Through the Eyes of Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia

Objective:Persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have been shown to exhibit altered morality, manifested as atypical utilitarian tendencies towards sacrificial moral dilemmas. This takes the form of endorsing harmful actions towards single individuals, including vulnerable o...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society 2023-11, Vol.29 (s1), p.267-268
Hauptverfasser: Antoniou, Rea, Haeusermann, Tobias, Sideman, Alissa Bernstein, Fong, Celeste, Callahan, Patrick, Chen, Sherry, Miller, Bruce L., Chiong, Winston, Rankin, Katherine P.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 268
container_issue s1
container_start_page 267
container_title Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society
container_volume 29
creator Antoniou, Rea
Haeusermann, Tobias
Sideman, Alissa Bernstein
Fong, Celeste
Callahan, Patrick
Chen, Sherry
Miller, Bruce L.
Chiong, Winston
Rankin, Katherine P.
description Objective:Persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have been shown to exhibit altered morality, manifested as atypical utilitarian tendencies towards sacrificial moral dilemmas. This takes the form of endorsing harmful actions towards single individuals, including vulnerable or relationally close individuals (e.g. children, loved ones), in order to promote the greater good for the community or society as a whole. The dual process model of moral cognition interprets such tendencies as deriving from a lack of emotional engagement, whereas moral emotion theory views them as selective impairment in prosocial sentiments. We hypothesized that both the widespread neuropsychological practice of using sacrificial moral dilemmas to evaluate moral reasoning, and these tests' overreliance on quantitative results, inadequately represent how persons with bvFTD reason and feel while responding to moral dilemmas. To evaluate this hypothesis, we applied a mixed-methods approach to identify the reasoning, motivations, and emotional experiences of bvFTD persons during their deliberation about moral scenarios.Participants and Methods:We conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 participants: 7 persons with bvFTD & 7 older healthy controls. Transcripts were coded in Atlas 5.0 to characterize the underlying reasoning, emotions, response processes, and values that emerged when responding to a structured set of moral dilemmas. Our dilemmas measured utilitarian reasoning holistically by incorporating both sacrificial and impartial/altruistic components, as suggested by the 2-dimensional model of utilitarianism.Results:Unexpectedly, bvFTD persons articulated a prosocial compass when asked about their values, stating they were organizing their choices predominantly around kindness and altruism, even when they were making choices to harm loved ones or vulnerable individuals to promote the greater good. During moral deliberation, persons with bvFTD showed significantly less metacognition (bvFTD = 10%, HC = 90%) but reported more positive emotions (joy; bvFTD = 83%, HC = 17%) than negative (frustration; bvFTD = 30 %, HC = 70 %) compared to controls. Qualitatively, this observed emotional outlook was typically coupled with a more rigid, simplistic viewpoint (e.g., "I felt great, it was a no brainer"), suggesting a moral understanding lacking emotional nuance and complexity.Conclusions:Our data showed that bvFTD persons' utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas d
doi_str_mv 10.1017/S1355617723003806
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2904222715</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><cupid>10_1017_S1355617723003806</cupid><sourcerecordid>2904222715</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c1576-6e1a47a419d818fc553810357e57dbe82a1a4feafe4e2ae7d70626e6d4a4e5423</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kM1Lw0AQxRdRsFb_AG8LnqM7-5ketbYqVEStXsO0mbQpTbbupkL_e9MP8CCeZpjfe2_gMXYJ4hoEuJt3UMZYcE4qIVQq7BHrgLa9xFkLx-3e4mTLT9lZjAshQIEQHfZqJX_2AZf8jTD6uqxnfDwPfj2b82ZOfLChyH3B72iO3-VO-ImhxLrhw-DrxjdUrXbne6qobko8ZycFLiNdHGaXfQwH4_5jMnp5eOrfjpIpGGcTS4DaoYZenkJaTI1RKQhlHBmXTyiV2PKCsCBNEsnlTlhpyeYaNRktVZdd7XNXwX-tKTbZwq9D3b7MZE9oKaUD06pgr5oGH2OgIluFssKwyUBk2-ayP821HnXwYDUJZT6j3-j_XT-Ud27d</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2904222715</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>62 Moral Reasoning Through the Eyes of Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia</title><source>Cambridge University Press Journals Complete</source><creator>Antoniou, Rea ; Haeusermann, Tobias ; Sideman, Alissa Bernstein ; Fong, Celeste ; Callahan, Patrick ; Chen, Sherry ; Miller, Bruce L. ; Chiong, Winston ; Rankin, Katherine P.</creator><creatorcontrib>Antoniou, Rea ; Haeusermann, Tobias ; Sideman, Alissa Bernstein ; Fong, Celeste ; Callahan, Patrick ; Chen, Sherry ; Miller, Bruce L. ; Chiong, Winston ; Rankin, Katherine P.</creatorcontrib><description>Objective:Persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have been shown to exhibit altered morality, manifested as atypical utilitarian tendencies towards sacrificial moral dilemmas. This takes the form of endorsing harmful actions towards single individuals, including vulnerable or relationally close individuals (e.g. children, loved ones), in order to promote the greater good for the community or society as a whole. The dual process model of moral cognition interprets such tendencies as deriving from a lack of emotional engagement, whereas moral emotion theory views them as selective impairment in prosocial sentiments. We hypothesized that both the widespread neuropsychological practice of using sacrificial moral dilemmas to evaluate moral reasoning, and these tests' overreliance on quantitative results, inadequately represent how persons with bvFTD reason and feel while responding to moral dilemmas. To evaluate this hypothesis, we applied a mixed-methods approach to identify the reasoning, motivations, and emotional experiences of bvFTD persons during their deliberation about moral scenarios.Participants and Methods:We conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 participants: 7 persons with bvFTD &amp; 7 older healthy controls. Transcripts were coded in Atlas 5.0 to characterize the underlying reasoning, emotions, response processes, and values that emerged when responding to a structured set of moral dilemmas. Our dilemmas measured utilitarian reasoning holistically by incorporating both sacrificial and impartial/altruistic components, as suggested by the 2-dimensional model of utilitarianism.Results:Unexpectedly, bvFTD persons articulated a prosocial compass when asked about their values, stating they were organizing their choices predominantly around kindness and altruism, even when they were making choices to harm loved ones or vulnerable individuals to promote the greater good. During moral deliberation, persons with bvFTD showed significantly less metacognition (bvFTD = 10%, HC = 90%) but reported more positive emotions (joy; bvFTD = 83%, HC = 17%) than negative (frustration; bvFTD = 30 %, HC = 70 %) compared to controls. Qualitatively, this observed emotional outlook was typically coupled with a more rigid, simplistic viewpoint (e.g., "I felt great, it was a no brainer"), suggesting a moral understanding lacking emotional nuance and complexity.Conclusions:Our data showed that bvFTD persons' utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas did not arise from an emotionally flat or antisocial cognitive perspective, but instead were guided by positive emotionality, simplistic reasoning, and prosocial values. These findings challenge the current understanding of the reasoning processes and experiences of persons with bvFTD and highlight the importance of incorporating mixed method approaches in dementia research that take into consideration the viewpoint of the cognitively compromised individual.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1355-6177</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1469-7661</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1017/S1355617723003806</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York, USA: Cambridge University Press</publisher><subject>Altruism ; Cognitive ability ; Dementia ; Dementia (Non-AD) ; Dementia disorders ; Emotions ; Frontotemporal dementia ; Frustration ; Morality ; Poster Session 03: Dementia | Amnesia | Memory | Language | Executive Functions ; Social behavior</subject><ispartof>Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 2023-11, Vol.29 (s1), p.267-268</ispartof><rights>Copyright © INS. Published by Cambridge University Press, 2023</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1355617723003806/type/journal_article$$EHTML$$P50$$Gcambridge$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>164,314,780,784,27923,27924,55627</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Antoniou, Rea</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haeusermann, Tobias</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sideman, Alissa Bernstein</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Fong, Celeste</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Callahan, Patrick</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Sherry</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Miller, Bruce L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chiong, Winston</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rankin, Katherine P.</creatorcontrib><title>62 Moral Reasoning Through the Eyes of Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia</title><title>Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society</title><addtitle>J Int Neuropsychol Soc</addtitle><description>Objective:Persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have been shown to exhibit altered morality, manifested as atypical utilitarian tendencies towards sacrificial moral dilemmas. This takes the form of endorsing harmful actions towards single individuals, including vulnerable or relationally close individuals (e.g. children, loved ones), in order to promote the greater good for the community or society as a whole. The dual process model of moral cognition interprets such tendencies as deriving from a lack of emotional engagement, whereas moral emotion theory views them as selective impairment in prosocial sentiments. We hypothesized that both the widespread neuropsychological practice of using sacrificial moral dilemmas to evaluate moral reasoning, and these tests' overreliance on quantitative results, inadequately represent how persons with bvFTD reason and feel while responding to moral dilemmas. To evaluate this hypothesis, we applied a mixed-methods approach to identify the reasoning, motivations, and emotional experiences of bvFTD persons during their deliberation about moral scenarios.Participants and Methods:We conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 participants: 7 persons with bvFTD &amp; 7 older healthy controls. Transcripts were coded in Atlas 5.0 to characterize the underlying reasoning, emotions, response processes, and values that emerged when responding to a structured set of moral dilemmas. Our dilemmas measured utilitarian reasoning holistically by incorporating both sacrificial and impartial/altruistic components, as suggested by the 2-dimensional model of utilitarianism.Results:Unexpectedly, bvFTD persons articulated a prosocial compass when asked about their values, stating they were organizing their choices predominantly around kindness and altruism, even when they were making choices to harm loved ones or vulnerable individuals to promote the greater good. During moral deliberation, persons with bvFTD showed significantly less metacognition (bvFTD = 10%, HC = 90%) but reported more positive emotions (joy; bvFTD = 83%, HC = 17%) than negative (frustration; bvFTD = 30 %, HC = 70 %) compared to controls. Qualitatively, this observed emotional outlook was typically coupled with a more rigid, simplistic viewpoint (e.g., "I felt great, it was a no brainer"), suggesting a moral understanding lacking emotional nuance and complexity.Conclusions:Our data showed that bvFTD persons' utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas did not arise from an emotionally flat or antisocial cognitive perspective, but instead were guided by positive emotionality, simplistic reasoning, and prosocial values. These findings challenge the current understanding of the reasoning processes and experiences of persons with bvFTD and highlight the importance of incorporating mixed method approaches in dementia research that take into consideration the viewpoint of the cognitively compromised individual.</description><subject>Altruism</subject><subject>Cognitive ability</subject><subject>Dementia</subject><subject>Dementia (Non-AD)</subject><subject>Dementia disorders</subject><subject>Emotions</subject><subject>Frontotemporal dementia</subject><subject>Frustration</subject><subject>Morality</subject><subject>Poster Session 03: Dementia | Amnesia | Memory | Language | Executive Functions</subject><subject>Social behavior</subject><issn>1355-6177</issn><issn>1469-7661</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2023</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kM1Lw0AQxRdRsFb_AG8LnqM7-5ketbYqVEStXsO0mbQpTbbupkL_e9MP8CCeZpjfe2_gMXYJ4hoEuJt3UMZYcE4qIVQq7BHrgLa9xFkLx-3e4mTLT9lZjAshQIEQHfZqJX_2AZf8jTD6uqxnfDwPfj2b82ZOfLChyH3B72iO3-VO-ImhxLrhw-DrxjdUrXbne6qobko8ZycFLiNdHGaXfQwH4_5jMnp5eOrfjpIpGGcTS4DaoYZenkJaTI1RKQhlHBmXTyiV2PKCsCBNEsnlTlhpyeYaNRktVZdd7XNXwX-tKTbZwq9D3b7MZE9oKaUD06pgr5oGH2OgIluFssKwyUBk2-ayP821HnXwYDUJZT6j3-j_XT-Ud27d</recordid><startdate>202311</startdate><enddate>202311</enddate><creator>Antoniou, Rea</creator><creator>Haeusermann, Tobias</creator><creator>Sideman, Alissa Bernstein</creator><creator>Fong, Celeste</creator><creator>Callahan, Patrick</creator><creator>Chen, Sherry</creator><creator>Miller, Bruce L.</creator><creator>Chiong, Winston</creator><creator>Rankin, Katherine P.</creator><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7TK</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>88G</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M2M</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PSYQQ</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>202311</creationdate><title>62 Moral Reasoning Through the Eyes of Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia</title><author>Antoniou, Rea ; Haeusermann, Tobias ; Sideman, Alissa Bernstein ; Fong, Celeste ; Callahan, Patrick ; Chen, Sherry ; Miller, Bruce L. ; Chiong, Winston ; Rankin, Katherine P.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c1576-6e1a47a419d818fc553810357e57dbe82a1a4feafe4e2ae7d70626e6d4a4e5423</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2023</creationdate><topic>Altruism</topic><topic>Cognitive ability</topic><topic>Dementia</topic><topic>Dementia (Non-AD)</topic><topic>Dementia disorders</topic><topic>Emotions</topic><topic>Frontotemporal dementia</topic><topic>Frustration</topic><topic>Morality</topic><topic>Poster Session 03: Dementia | Amnesia | Memory | Language | Executive Functions</topic><topic>Social behavior</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Antoniou, Rea</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haeusermann, Tobias</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sideman, Alissa Bernstein</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Fong, Celeste</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Callahan, Patrick</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Sherry</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Miller, Bruce L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chiong, Winston</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rankin, Katherine P.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Neurosciences Abstracts</collection><collection>Health &amp; Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Psychology Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>ProQuest Health &amp; Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health &amp; Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Medical Database</collection><collection>Psychology Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest One Psychology</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Antoniou, Rea</au><au>Haeusermann, Tobias</au><au>Sideman, Alissa Bernstein</au><au>Fong, Celeste</au><au>Callahan, Patrick</au><au>Chen, Sherry</au><au>Miller, Bruce L.</au><au>Chiong, Winston</au><au>Rankin, Katherine P.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>62 Moral Reasoning Through the Eyes of Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia</atitle><jtitle>Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society</jtitle><addtitle>J Int Neuropsychol Soc</addtitle><date>2023-11</date><risdate>2023</risdate><volume>29</volume><issue>s1</issue><spage>267</spage><epage>268</epage><pages>267-268</pages><issn>1355-6177</issn><eissn>1469-7661</eissn><abstract>Objective:Persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have been shown to exhibit altered morality, manifested as atypical utilitarian tendencies towards sacrificial moral dilemmas. This takes the form of endorsing harmful actions towards single individuals, including vulnerable or relationally close individuals (e.g. children, loved ones), in order to promote the greater good for the community or society as a whole. The dual process model of moral cognition interprets such tendencies as deriving from a lack of emotional engagement, whereas moral emotion theory views them as selective impairment in prosocial sentiments. We hypothesized that both the widespread neuropsychological practice of using sacrificial moral dilemmas to evaluate moral reasoning, and these tests' overreliance on quantitative results, inadequately represent how persons with bvFTD reason and feel while responding to moral dilemmas. To evaluate this hypothesis, we applied a mixed-methods approach to identify the reasoning, motivations, and emotional experiences of bvFTD persons during their deliberation about moral scenarios.Participants and Methods:We conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 participants: 7 persons with bvFTD &amp; 7 older healthy controls. Transcripts were coded in Atlas 5.0 to characterize the underlying reasoning, emotions, response processes, and values that emerged when responding to a structured set of moral dilemmas. Our dilemmas measured utilitarian reasoning holistically by incorporating both sacrificial and impartial/altruistic components, as suggested by the 2-dimensional model of utilitarianism.Results:Unexpectedly, bvFTD persons articulated a prosocial compass when asked about their values, stating they were organizing their choices predominantly around kindness and altruism, even when they were making choices to harm loved ones or vulnerable individuals to promote the greater good. During moral deliberation, persons with bvFTD showed significantly less metacognition (bvFTD = 10%, HC = 90%) but reported more positive emotions (joy; bvFTD = 83%, HC = 17%) than negative (frustration; bvFTD = 30 %, HC = 70 %) compared to controls. Qualitatively, this observed emotional outlook was typically coupled with a more rigid, simplistic viewpoint (e.g., "I felt great, it was a no brainer"), suggesting a moral understanding lacking emotional nuance and complexity.Conclusions:Our data showed that bvFTD persons' utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas did not arise from an emotionally flat or antisocial cognitive perspective, but instead were guided by positive emotionality, simplistic reasoning, and prosocial values. These findings challenge the current understanding of the reasoning processes and experiences of persons with bvFTD and highlight the importance of incorporating mixed method approaches in dementia research that take into consideration the viewpoint of the cognitively compromised individual.</abstract><cop>New York, USA</cop><pub>Cambridge University Press</pub><doi>10.1017/S1355617723003806</doi><tpages>2</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1355-6177
ispartof Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 2023-11, Vol.29 (s1), p.267-268
issn 1355-6177
1469-7661
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2904222715
source Cambridge University Press Journals Complete
subjects Altruism
Cognitive ability
Dementia
Dementia (Non-AD)
Dementia disorders
Emotions
Frontotemporal dementia
Frustration
Morality
Poster Session 03: Dementia | Amnesia | Memory | Language | Executive Functions
Social behavior
title 62 Moral Reasoning Through the Eyes of Behavioral Variant Frontotemporal Dementia
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-08T10%3A09%3A57IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=62%20Moral%20Reasoning%20Through%20the%20Eyes%20of%20Behavioral%20Variant%20Frontotemporal%20Dementia&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20the%20International%20Neuropsychological%20Society&rft.au=Antoniou,%20Rea&rft.date=2023-11&rft.volume=29&rft.issue=s1&rft.spage=267&rft.epage=268&rft.pages=267-268&rft.issn=1355-6177&rft.eissn=1469-7661&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017/S1355617723003806&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2904222715%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2904222715&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_cupid=10_1017_S1355617723003806&rfr_iscdi=true